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“Like many businessmen of genius he learned that free competition was wasteful,
monopoly efficient. And so he simply set about achieving that efficient
monopoly.”1

INTRODUCTION
Investors, employees, and regulators are still reeling from the recent
spectacular accounting improprieties committed by the largest of U.S.
corporations. Fraud and scandal at Enron Corporation2 and WorldCom,
Inc.3 drove them each into bankruptcy less than eight months apart. At
1.
MARIO PUZO, THE GODFATHER 213 (Signet 1978) (1969).
2.
On December 2, 2001, Enron Corporation, the once-multibillion dollar
energy company and strident advocate for energy deregulation, hobbled into bankruptcy
after having made a series of startling disclosures concerning financial misreporting and
serious conflicts of interest. On October 16, 2001, the company announced a $1 billion
charge against its third-quarter earnings to correct for other accounting errors related to the
financing of affiliated entities. The next day, the Wall Street Journal reported that $35
million of Enron’s losses related to its dealings with two partnerships run by its chief
financial officer, Andrew Fastow. See Kurt Eichenwald with Diana B. Henriques, Enron
Buffed Image to a Shine Even as It Rotted From Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at A1.
In November, the firm announced that it had overstated earnings from 1997 forward by
$586 million, a reporting error due primarily to improper accounting for its dealings with
affiliated entities. A corrected restatement of its earnings reduced profits for the period by
twenty percent. See John R. Emshwiller et al., Enron Slashes Profits Since 1997 by 20%,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2001, at A3. In fact, for months Enron had been hiding hundreds of
millions of dollars in losses by stashing them on the books of nominally independent
affiliated entities. A substantial portion of its profits over a four-year period were
apparently generated through accounting manipulations. See SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
COMM. OF THE BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (Feb. 1, 2002).
At its peak stock price near $90 per share in August 2000, Enron was America’s
seventh largest corporation by market capitalization. William W. Bratton, Does
Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders and Other Stakeholders?: Enron and
the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TULANE L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2002). By the time
of Enron’s bankruptcy, investors in the company had seen $63 billion in market value
wiped out in less than a year. See Peter Coy et al., Enron: Running on Empty, BUS. WK.,
Dec. 10, 2001, at 80. Enron employees were among those unfortunate investors. At the
end of 2000, their company pension plan held $2.1 billion in assets, of which $1.3 billion
consisted of Enron stock. That stock is now worthless. See Theo Francis & Ellen Schultz,
Enron Faces Suits by 401(k) Plan Participants, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2001, at C1.
3.
On July 21, 2002, telecommunications giant WorldCom, Inc. filed for
bankruptcy on the heels of the company’s announcement that it had “misstated”
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the time of their respective filings, each enjoyed the dubious honor of
being the largest bankruptcy filing in history.4 Responding to these and
other illegalities, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
Department of Justice, numerous Congressional committees, and the New
York State Attorney General’s Office all launched investigations. The
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) formed a Corporate Accountability
and Listing Standards Committee to recommend corporate governance
reform.5 Corporate officers have been indicted for securities fraud.6
Numerous civil suits have been filed on behalf of investors.7 And
Congress and the NYSE have imposed far reaching new corporate
governance and accountability rules on public companies.8 Other nations

expenses—and thus overstated profits—in 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 by $3.85
billion. Later disclosures admitted that for a period from 1999 through 2002, the firm had
overstated profits by at least $7.2 billion, a figure that likely makes it the largest
accounting fraud in history. Jared Sandberg & Susan Pulliam, WorldCom Revision Might
Double, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2002, at A3. In addition, its former CEO borrowed $400
million from the company before he was ousted, a sum he still owes. Steven Rosenbush et
al., Inside the Telecom Game: How a Small Group of Insiders Made Billions as the
Industry Collapsed, BUS. WK., Aug. 5, 2002, at 34.
4.
Shawn Young et al., WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Jul. 22,
2002, at A3; Wendy Zellner et al., The Fall of Enron, BUS. WK., Dec. 17, 2001, at 33. In
its filing, WorldCom listed $107 billion in assets, while Enron’s filing involved a “mere”
$63.4 billion in assets. Young, supra, at A3.
5.
See generally N.Y. STOCK EXCH., YOUR MARKET: STRAIGHT TALK FOR
INVESTORS (July 2002).
6.
See Jerry Markon & Jared Sandberg, Ex-WorldCom Officials Are Indicted,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2002, at A3.
7.
See, e.g., Francis & Schultz, supra note 2; New York Fund to Lead
WorldCom Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2002, at B4.
8.
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the most sweeping corporate
regulatory statute since the Great Depression. See Public Company Accounting Reform
and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). Among other things, the Act
imposes requirements as to (i) officer certification of firms’ annual and quarterly reports,
see id. 15 U.S.C. § 7241, (ii) the composition and function of corporate boards’ audit
committees, see id. § 78j-1, and (iii) the independence of outside auditors, see id. §§ 78c,
78g, 78j-1, 78l. The Act also establishes a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
to oversee outside auditors of public companies, see id. §§ 77s, 78m, 7211-7219, and
creates new criminal offenses and raises penalties for some existing offenses, see id.
§§ 7242, 7244. Proposed NYSE rules impose requirements as to director independence
and the composition, function, and authority of non-management directors and boards’
audit compensation, and nominating/governance committees. Each listed company must
adopt and disclose corporate governance guidelines and a code of business conduct and
ethics. The new rules also require shareholder approval of almost all stock option plans.
See NYSE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULE PROPOSALS REFLECTING RECOMMENDATIONS
COMMITTEE AS APPROVED BY THE NYSE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, August 1, 2002, available
at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp_gov_pro_b.pdf. The proposed rules are subject to SEC
approval and are expected to be approved. See Kip Betz, NYSE Board Approves Changes
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as well, searching for models of transparency and accountability for their
securities laws, have reconsidered their earlier embrace of the U.S.
example.9
It is ironic that during this period of corporate scandal and regulatory
soul searching, one of the most spirited debates among corporate and
securities law scholars has focused on reform proposals for international
securities regulation that essentially call for corporate self-regulation.
According to these proposals—one by Roberta Romano of Yale Law
School,10 and the other by Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman at Boalt
Hall11—an issuer of securities should be allowed to choose the regime of
securities regulation that will govern it, and all nations would commit to
respecting each firm’s particular choice of securities law. Each firm
would be allowed to select the securities regulatory regime of any
country, and have that chosen regulation govern the firm’s securities
activities in every country.12 Given the choice, the argument goes, each
issuer would pick the regulatory regime that offers the optimal level of
regulation for itself and its investors. Proponents assert, therefore, that
this “issuer choice” approach achieves efficient securities regulation on a
global basis.
Existing regulation and regulatory practice in the world are
inefficient, according to issuer choice advocates. As currently structured,
securities regulation is territorial. That is, each nation claims exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate securities transactions that occur within its
borders. This is problematic for issuer choice proponents. Because each
national regulator insists on exclusivity in regulating the offering, selling,
and trading of securities within its national borders, territoriality
effectively grants each regulator a national “monopoly” on regulation. As
monopolists, regulators have insufficient incentive to offer efficient
to Corporate Governance Listing Standards, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1269 (BNA) (Aug. 5,
2002).
9.
See A Whiff of Impropriety: Corporate Wrongdoing in Japan, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 2002, at 54-55 (discussing Japanese accounting reform efforts).
10.
See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering
Investors]; Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, Need for
Competition]. Romano has recently published a book-length treatment of her proposal.
See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM IN SECURITIES
REGULATION (2002).
11.
See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking
the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998)
12.
This is tantamount to self-regulation since presumably a country exists that
would oblige the regulatory desires of any firm willing to pay an appropriate fee.
International tax, banking, and bankruptcy havens provide useful analogies. See infra note
17 and accompanying text.

2002:1363

From Monopolists to Markets?

1367

rules—the rules that issuers and investors would prefer.13 Instead,
national regulators are free to benefit themselves and favored constituents
through their rulemaking,14 at the expense of issuers and investors.
The issuer choice antidote to this curse of regulatory monopoly is, of
course, competition. In effect, proponents of issuer choice call for the
creation of an international market in securities regulation. In this market,
regulation itself is the product, one that nations would “sell” and firms
and investors would “buy.” National regulators and other law givers in
each nation would “supply” securities regulation in this market. And the
consumers of securities laws, of course, are issuers and investors. Free to
choose their securities laws, they would make up the market “demand.”15
With firms free to choose their law, national regulators would be forced to
compete to supply desirable regulation.
Not surprisingly, the issuer choice idea has sparked a spirited debate
among scholars, and has even captured the attention of the popular
press.16 Under issuer choice, securities law should never be mandatory
but should be a matter for firms’ private choice. Issuers may choose any
regulation or no regulation,17 and while issuer choice advocates express
confidence that market forces will prod most issuers to submit to
nontrivial regulation, policy makers throughout the world would have to
be prepared to honor an issuer’s choice of “no regulation.”18
To date, the primary challenge to issuer choice has been that it will
not “work” as predicted. Scholars have focused primarily on the demand
side of the market for regulation—questioning whether the behavior of
firms and investors would truly create a demand for efficient law. Merritt
Fox doubts that firm managers have the right incentives to choose optimal
regulation,19 and Jim Cox has questioned whether investors in the market
13.
Another problem for Choi & Guzman is that some nations, like the United
States, may sometimes extend the reach of their laws to apply extraterritorially. This may
raise concerns over conflicts with other nations’ laws. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T.
Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 207 (1996).
14.
This private interest view of regulatory behavior is a fairly standard
perspective in the public choice literature. See infra Part I.B.3.
15.
A firm’s managers would select the regulatory regime applicable to the firm,
and investors would choose the firms in which they prefer to invest, presumably taking
account of each firm’s chosen regulatory regime.
16.
See The Market for Regulation, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 1998, at 82.
17.
Choi has made this point explicitly. See Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer
Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 815, 816 (2001).
18.
With issuer choice, Enron and WorldCom, for example, could have avoided
indictments, lawsuits, and investigations had they simply elected to be governed by a
regulatory regime compatible with the creative accounting they each practiced.
19.
See Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
563, 564 (2001) [hereinafter Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate]; Merritt B. Fox, The
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can efficiently price differences in regulatory regimes.20 By contrast, this
Article focuses on a different question: not on whether issuer choice
would work but on whether it would ever happen. This important
question has yet to be explored in the scholarly literature. My claim is
that issuer choice is politically implausible. I examine the supply side of
the market for securities regulation, focusing on choice of law rules and
the incentives of political actors to supply them. I argue that given the
stated assumptions of issuer choice advocates, issuer choice is very
unlikely ever to come about.
For the issuer choice model to work, national regulators must supply
two different types of rules—not only substantive securities regulation,
but choice of law rules as well. In particular, each nation would have to
forswear its customary territorial jurisdiction over securities activity that
occurs within its borders. Instead, it would have to agree that for each
firm engaging in securities activity within its territory, it would apply the
securities law that the firm had selected. While analysts on all sides have
discussed the dynamics of competition over substantive rules, they have
ignored the fact that competition over substantive rules requires
cooperation among nations in structuring the international market in
which the various nations would compete over substantive rules. This
requires that states agree on a choice of law rule honoring firm choice.
But there is a problem. Issuer choice proposals rely critically on
standard public choice assumptions about the incentives and motivations
of political actors.21 Under these assumptions, regulators in general desire
to aggrandize their bureaucracies, and with securities regulation, they do
this by maximizing the number of firms and transactions under their
regulatory purview. For issuer choice, this explains why regulators would
compete to offer desirable securities law if firms were free to choose their
own laws. Each national regulator would wish to maximize the number
of firms adopting her laws in order to enhance the scope and importance
of her bureaucracy.
On these assumptions, however, it is difficult to see how the
appropriate choice of law rules could emerge, or how international
agreement on them could be reached. In a word, we can’t get there from
here. The very incentives that would theoretically drive national
Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for
Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696, 749 (1998) [hereinafter Fox, Political Economy];
Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retaining
Mandatory Securities Disclosure]; see also infra note 95 and accompanying text.
20.
See James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1234 (1999); see also infra text accompanying note 96.
21.
See infra Part I.B.3.
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regulators to compete, if an international market for regulation existed,
would also make them unwilling to supply the choice of law rules
essential to creating that market in the first place, at least in important
jurisdictions. Regulators with cozy regulatory monopolies, intent on
aggrandizing their bureaucracies, would oppose competition. They would
not agree to respect firms’ private choice of securities regulation, since
that would expose their bureaucracies to challenge. Rather than
surrendering their national monopolies, they would instead fight to
preserve their protected markets.
I also consider the possibility that other national lawmakers—
legislators and executives—could supply the requisite choice of law rules
for issuer choice. But I ultimately discount that possibility. Informational
advantages will enable regulators to play a dominant role in formulating
policy on international securities regulation, making it difficult for
legislators or executives to initiate fundamental reform that regulators
oppose. In addition, interest groups in important jurisdictions will not
support issuer choice, making it even less likely that legislators or
executives would take up the cause. For argument’s sake, I remain true to
the public choice assumptions adopted by issuer choice advocates in order
to show the difficulty of telling a consistent issuer choice story that
includes the necessary choice of law rules. A public choice approach
suggests a move not toward issuer choice, but toward “regulatory price
discrimination” by important jurisdictions, as well as possible efforts
toward increased international harmonization. I rely primarily on
examples from U.S. law in my analysis, generalizing to other countries
where appropriate.
Part I of the Article provides background. It discusses the strains
placed on national regulatory regimes by global securities markets, and it
describes the main issuer choice proposals. Part II discusses regulators’
calculus in the face of issuers’ and investors’ increasing international
mobility. It describes the opportunities and constraints of regulators in
different types of jurisdictions in terms of pursuing their private interests.
In “price-setting jurisdictions,” regulators will pursue regulatory price
discrimination, not issuer choice. Part III examines the probable
influences of interest groups on the prospects for achieving the
international choice of law cooperation required for issuer choice. It
argues that regulators will dominate legislators and executives in setting
policy on international securities regulation, and that no interest group
would unambiguously support issuer choice. Part IV concludes.
I. BACKGROUND: THE CURRENT TERRITORIAL SYSTEM AND ISSUER
CHOICE PROPOSALS
In this Part, I begin by describing the territorial system that currently
prevails in the world and efforts by regulators to adapt national regulation
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to the global securities market. With the increasing international mobility
of issuers and investors, it becomes more and more common that
activities in one country may affect securities markets in others. In the
face of this phenomenon, national regulators may have difficulty
enforcing their national laws or protecting their national markets from
effects that originate abroad. I describe two different adaptive
approaches—extraterritoriality and harmonization—that aim to assure the
effectiveness of national regulation. U.S. law illustrates regulators’
extraterritorial tendency. It shows a tension between nominal territoriality
and national regulators’ temptation to extend their reach—regulating
transactions with fairly weak connections to their domestic securities
markets—in order to assure the effectiveness of their national laws. This
extraterritorial tendency may lead to conflicts of law, as national
regulatory systems overlap in their regulatory efforts.
Harmonization, the second approach, involves nations’ attempts to
align substantive policies and cross-border enforcement efforts. Through
this coordinated approach, national regulators hope to vindicate national
policies and prevent their easy circumvention by actors that might
otherwise seek out lax jurisdictions in which to conduct securities
activities.22
Issuer choice advocates condemn both these approaches as mere
attempts by regulators to extend the reach of their territorial monopolies.
After describing this uneasy fit between national regulation and
international transactions, I sketch the issuer choice approach as proposed
separately by Romano23 and Choi and Guzman.24 While distinctive in the
details, the central argument in both proposals is that issuers should be
allowed to choose the regime of securities regulation under which they
will be governed worldwide. I then introduce the problem of choice of
law cooperation, which would be necessary to create the international
market for securities regulation envisioned by issuer choice proponents.

22.
For example, when a company lists its securities for trading on multiple
exchanges in different countries, prohibitions against insider trading in one country can
easily be circumvented by trading on the exchange of another country that has not adopted
or does not enforce the same prohibitions.
23.
See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 388-89; Romano,
Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 2361-62.
24.
See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 907.

2002:1363

From Monopolists to Markets?

1371

A. National Regulation, International Transactions
As with most laws, the reach of securities law is nominally
territorial.25 A nation typically applies its securities laws to securities
transactions that occur within its borders, or that have substantial effects
within its territory.26 For example, in the United States, every issuer that
lists its securities for trading on the NYSE is required to register under
Section 12(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)27
and becomes subject to periodic disclosure and reporting requirements
under that statute.28 This requirement applies whether the issuer is a
foreign corporation or a domestic one. On the other hand, a U.S. issuer
engaging in a public offering of its securities abroad must generally
comply with the laws of the jurisdiction in which the offering is made, but
provided certain conditions are met,29 the issuer is not required to comply
with the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act), which regulates public offerings in the United States.30
If each nation regulates only territorially, then at least conceptually,
conflicts of law can be avoided. With securities regulation, though, as in
many other areas, the conceptual tidiness of this territorial principle has
been rendered illusory. It has been strained by the ever-increasing
volume of cross-border securities offerings and trading. A Japanese
investor purchasing shares of a Dutch company listed on the NYSE, for
instance, is routine. Technological progress has made investors and
issuers increasingly more mobile. Firms can readily offer and sell, and
25.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987)
(describing bases of prescriptive jurisdiction). “Territoriality is considered the normal . .
. basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. § 402 cmt. b.
26.
The Restatement views the effects principle as an aspect of territoriality,
while recognizing that it is sometimes considered a distinct category. See id. § 402 cmt. d.
27.
15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2000).
28. See id. § 78m(a)-(h). The Exchange Act is the primary legislation relating to
regulation of national securities exchanges, among other things.
Daimler Benz felt the sting of U.S. reporting requirements when it decided to list its
shares on the NYSE in 1993. See Cox, supra note 20, at 1203. Daimler’s shares had been
listed only in Germany before 1993. See id. One nagging requirement for the firm in
listing in the United States and reporting under U.S. securities laws was the requirement to
reconcile its books to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). See id.
U.S. GAAP accounting made transparent Daimler’s practice, under more liberal German
accounting rules, of smoothing out earnings from year to year by in effect hiding earnings
as “reserves” in the more profitable years, and then drawing on those reserves in less
profitable years to boost earnings in those leaner years. See id. The contrasting results of
these accounting rules were made clear in the very first year of Daimler’s U.S. listing,
when it reported a $354 million profit under German accounting standards, but a loss of $1
billion under U.S. GAAP. See id.
29.
See Regulation S Rules 901-905, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.905 (2002).
30.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2000).
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investors can readily buy and trade, securities outside their home
countries. But which countries’ laws should or should not apply to these
cross-border transactions is not always clear. When conduct in one
country affects investors in another—say a fraudulent scheme is
perpetrated through the conduct of actors in several countries and causes
losses in yet another country—several nations may justifiably assert the
application of their national securities laws. Conflicts will arise. Choice
of law rules—allocating regulatory authority among sovereigns—become
critical.31 However, international efforts to coordinate securities
regulatory jurisdiction have been few and frustrating.32 Without clear
choice of law, conflicting assertions of territorial jurisdiction subject
transactions to multiple overlapping regulatory regimes, which may create
conflicting legal obligations, deter desirable transactions, and cause
tension among sovereigns.33 Scholars and policymakers are having to
face the question squarely: what should be the appropriate relationship
among national regulatory regimes?
Policymakers may have difficulty devising a simple or
straightforward answer, as U.S. law illustrates. U.S. securities law is
basically territorial. However, in certain areas, specific rules and
doctrines rely to some extent on extraterritorial reach in order to
safeguard U.S. investors or the U.S. market from harm. U.S. law might
therefore apply to predominantly foreign transactions, when exclusive
application of other countries’ laws might be more appropriate. I discuss
one example below: the Securities Act registration requirement and
Regulation S, which addresses offshore public offerings. Regulation S
illustrates the strain of attempting to apply territorial regulation to global
securities markets and the temptation to extraterritorial reach. In addition,
I briefly discuss one increasingly popular approach to international
regulatory coordination: harmonization of regulatory standards among
national securities regimes and the SEC’s efforts in that regard.
31.
As implied above, the focus here is primarily on prescriptive jurisdiction—
jurisdiction to prescribe applicable rules—and not on judicial or other enforcement
jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (discussing
prescriptive jurisdiction).
32.
Even within the European Union (EU), which has steadfastly pursued
regulatory coordination for decades, the results have not been encouraging. See Howell E.
Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets:
Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part I, 56 BUS. LAW. 653, 676 (2001). Through its Public
Offers Directive, for example, the EU attempted to create a “regulatory passport” system
to enable issuers to make public offerings of securities throughout the EU relying only on
their home country offering documents. See id. at 680. However, largely because of local
regulatory protectionism, the Public Offers Directive is not useful and has had virtually no
impact on public offerings within the EU. See id. at 680-81.
33.
See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90
GEO. L.J. 883 (2002).
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1. SECURITIES ACT REGISTRATION AND REGULATION S
For public offers and sales of securities, registration is generally
required under the Securities Act.34 Section 5, the cornerstone for
regulation of primary transactions in the United States,35 sets out the basic
registration requirement. Registration requires the production of an
extensive and complex disclosure document—the registration statement—
meant to provide adequate information to enable investors to make their
investment decisions.36 The registration statement must be filed with the
SEC before offers to buy or sell a security may be made.37 In addition,
the registration statement must be declared effective before any sale or
delivery of securities may occur.38
Through its promulgation of Regulation S,39 the SEC sought to
clarify application of the registration requirement to offshore offerings.
In terms of extraterritorial reach, Section 5 nominally applies to all offers
and sales of securities that “make use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce.”40 Interstate
commerce is defined quite broadly to include “trade or commerce in
securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto . . .
between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia.”41
Read literally, this definition of interstate commerce could extend the
reach of Section 5 to offerings by U.S. issuers made completely outside
the United States to foreign investors. Historically, however, the SEC has
never applied it so broadly. When questions of extraterritorial reach first
arose in the 1960s, the SEC articulated its view that registration was
meant primarily to protect U.S. investors. Therefore, registration would
not be required for offerings by U.S. issuers “made under circumstances

34.
Numerous exemptions exist. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION, at ch. 4 (4th ed. 2002).
35.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
36.
See id.
37.
See id. § 77e(c).
38.
See id. § 77e(a)(1).
39. See Regulation S Rules 901-905; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.905; see also
Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,524 at 80,661 (April 24, 1990) [hereinafter Regulation S
Initial Release]; Offshore Offers and Sales (Regulation S), Securities Act Release No.
7505, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,006, at 80,156 (Feb. 17, 1998) (amending Release No.
6863).
40.
15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1).
41.
Id. § 77b(7).

1374

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

reasonably designed to preclude distribution or redistribution of the
securities within, or to nationals of, the United States.”42
Regulation S, promulgated in 1990 in order to clarify then-existing
policy, declared the SEC’s explicit embrace of a territorial approach to
Securities Act registration.43 Regulation S provides safe harbors for
offers and sales of securities “outside the United States,”44 so that
registration is not required.45 “The territorial approach recognizes the
primacy of the laws in which a market is located. As investors choose
their markets, they choose the laws and regulations applicable in such
markets.”46 This approach marked a shift from protecting U.S. investors
generally to protecting “the U.S. capital markets and investors purchasing
in the U.S. market, whether U.S. or foreign nationals.”47
The Regulation S rules, however, may have extraterritorial effects
that belie their proclaimed territorial aspiration. In particular, the
regulation includes restrictions designed to prevent resale into the United
States of securities initially offered abroad, or “flowback.”48 These
flowback restrictions may directly affect wholly foreign transactions,
even though Regulation S was ostensibly meant to track a strictly
territorial design.
The basic definitions are not problematic. An issuer’s offer or sale
of securities is deemed “outside the United States” if:
(a) it is made only to persons outside the U.S.;
(b) either
(i) the purchasers are reasonably believed to be outside
the U.S. when they originate their purchase orders, or
(ii) the transactions are executed on an established foreign
securities exchange;
and
(c) there are no direct selling efforts in the United States.49
42.
MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW: A CONTEMPORARY
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 183 (1999) (quoting Securities Act Release No. 4708 (July
1964)). Through an initial release and subsequent no-action letters, the SEC crafted a
policy attempting to assure that securities issued offshore by U.S. issuers came to rest
abroad and did not flow back to the United States or to U.S. nationals. Id.
43.
See Regulation S Initial Release, supra note 39, at 80,665. See also Choi &
Guzman, supra note 13, at 210.
44.
Regulation S Initial Release, supra note 39, at 80,665.
45.
For discussions of the background and requirements of Regulation S, see
Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 708 and Choi & Guzman, supra note 13, at 210.
46.
See Regulation S Initial Release, supra note 39, at 80,665.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(h), 230.903(a).
AND
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However, depending on the type of securities involved, additional
restrictions aimed at preventing flowback into the United States may deter
wholly foreign transactions and interfere with other nations’ securities
markets.50 Offshore equity offerings by U.S. issuers, for example, may
not include offers or sales to U.S. persons for one year,51 even if those
investors signal their willingness to forego U.S. regulatory supervision by
purchasing outside the United States. In addition, non-U.S. residents
purchasing from the issuer must expressly agree to sell only to other nonU.S. purchasers, who agree to similar restrictions during the one-year
period, and so on.52 Not only do these transfer restrictions circumscribe
the ability of U.S. purchasers to opt out of U.S. regulation, as was
originally advertised with Regulation S,53 but they effectively preclude
issuers from listing shares issued under Regulation S for trading on a
foreign exchange, since compliance with Regulation S would be made
impossible.54 But the inability to list the shares makes them illiquid and
therefore relatively unattractive, drastically reducing the utility of
Regulation S equity offerings for U.S. issuers.55
50.
Id. § 230.903(b).
51.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii). This one-year period is referred to as the
“distribution compliance period.” Id. § 230.902(f). A “U.S. person” includes individuals
resident in the United States, partnerships and corporations organized under U.S. laws, and
trusts of which any trustee is a U.S. person. Id. § 230.902(k)(1).
52.
See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii); see also Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of
Primary Public Securities Markets, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 95 (2000)
(describing restriction on reselling to U.S. persons during distribution compliance period).
Equity securities of domestic issuers are also “restricted securities” under Rule 144. 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.144, 230.905. Resale into the United States of such Regulation S securities
may therefore also be subject to Rule 144 restrictions.
53.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
54.
In an impersonal, faceless stock exchange transaction, it would be practically
impossible for a seller to prescreen purchasers based on their country of residence or to
impose transfer restrictions as part of the transaction.
55.
See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 710 & n.33. Practical
application of Regulation S and Exchange Act registration rules to U.S. issuers also makes
it highly unlikely that even a U.S. firm that publicly offers shares only abroad could avoid
U.S. disclosure rules. Even if a U.S. issuer made its Regulation S share offering and
successfully avoided Securities Act registration, it is highly unlikely to be able to avoid
Exchange Act registration and the concomitant disclosure obligations. Section 12(g)(1)
and Rule 12g-1 of the Exchange Act together require registration by any issuer with $10
million in assets and more than 500 shareholders of record. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)
(2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2002). For the U.S. issuer, whether its shareholders are
foreign or domestic does not affect this registration requirement, which also triggers
mandatory disclosure very similar to that mandated under the Securities Act for public
offerings. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 715 & n.47. The issuer’s
reincorporation under the laws of a foreign country may make it marginally easier to avoid
U.S. regulation.
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Regulation S transfer restrictions may be necessary to prevent
flowback and the dangers to U.S. investors of trading in unregistered
securities.56 However, the restrictions significantly affect securities
activity in other nations as well. Fear of flowback prevents U.S. investors
from purchasing U.S. issuers’ equity offerings abroad, despite these
investors’ apparent willingness to live with the regulatory protections of a
foreign jurisdiction. Flowback concerns also preclude for a period the
foreign listing of U.S. issuers’ shares, at the peril of having to comply
with U.S. registration requirements! Regulation S thus has a significant
impact on the possibilities for offshore equity offerings by U.S. issuers,
even though under a territorial approach, the foreign jurisdiction’s
regulation would generally be expected to play the primary role in setting
the terms for offerings and listings within its borders. No doubt the risk
of these U.S. securities finding their way back to the United States is a
real one. However, the extraterritorial consequences of these rules also
illustrate the difficulty of structuring putatively territorial regulation
within neat territorial lines.
Commentators have criticized U.S. extraterritoriality from different
quarters. Not surprisingly, issuer choice advocates believe that U.S. law
overregulates to begin with, and that expanding its international reach
merely compounds the problem by impeding capital mobility and easy
exit by investors.57
2. HARMONIZATION EFFORTS
In addition to some creeping extraterritoriality in U.S. law, the SEC
and other national securities regulators have responded to international
securities activities with attempts at harmonizing substantive standards
and increasing cooperation in terms of information sharing and
enforcement. The SEC has taken a leading role in these endeavors. It has
A U.S.-listed foreign issuer may also find its wholly foreign offering subjected to
annoying restrictions. For instance, if the foreign offering is made in two or more
countries and there is “substantial U.S. market interest” in the security, not only are sales
to U.S. persons precluded for forty days, but the issuer’s underwriter and other distributors
must agree in writing that offers and sales will not run afoul of U.S. registration
requirements, and all offering materials must state that the securities have not been
registered under the Securities Act and may not be offered or sold in the United States or
to U.S. persons, absent registration or an available exemption. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)
(2002).
56.
See Problematic Practices Under Regulation S, Exchange Act Release No.
33-7190, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,663 (July 10, 1995); Josh Futterman, Note, Evasion and
Flowback in the Regulation S Era: Strengthening U.S. Investor Protection While
Promoting U.S. Corporate Offshore Offerings, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 806 (1995).
57.
See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 2362; Choi &
Guzman, supra note 13.
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been a leading proponent of harmonization through its participation in the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),58 pushing
other nations to adopt disclosure and accounting standards, insider trading
prohibitions, and other rules comparable to those of the United States.59
In addition, the SEC has executed Memoranda of Understanding with
several dozen countries in order to facilitate information sharing in
furtherance of extraterritorial enforcement of their respective domestic
securities laws.60
The SEC approach implies that all nations should adopt high
regulatory standards similar to those operating in the United States. With
greater international harmonization toward U.S. standards, issuers and
investors would have more difficulty fleeing to lax jurisdictions to
conduct their securities activities. On this view, territorial limitations on
regulators’ reach are a problem to be overcome, since territorial
competition for issuers and investors may result in a race to the bottom
for regulatory standards. The SEC’s harmonization efforts respond to this
perceived problem by pushing regulatory standards upward across the
board.
For issuer choice advocates, of course, this is exactly the wrong way
to proceed. For them, the appropriate relationship among national
regulatory regimes is as competitors, and the appropriate international
system is one that forces national regimes to compete with each other to

58.
IOSCO membership includes the national regulatory authorities of most
nations. See Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Membership Lists, at
http://www.iosco.org/memberslist.html (last modified Jan. 7, 2003).
59.
Foreign issuers in the Unites States now file their annual reports on form 20F, adopted by the SEC in 1999, which conforms to IOSCO international disclosure
standards. See International Disclosure Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7745, 70
SEC Docket (CCH), at 1474 (Sept. 28, 1999) (adopting release); see also INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS: THE SEC’S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM 752 (PLI Order No. B0-017O
February 2002) [hereinafter SEC’S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM] (describing SEC
involvement with IASB, IOSCO); Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public
Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State,
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 953 (1996) (discussing harmonization of insider trading rules);
David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 302 (1998) (suggesting that
“the SEC plays an overwhelmingly influential role in IOSCO” (citing TONY PORTER,
STATES, MARKETS AND REGIMES IN GLOBAL FINANCE 122-23 (1993))).
60.
See SEC’S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM, supra note 59, at 772-73; STEINBERG,
supra note 42, at 214 (discussing SEC Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with other
nations). These MOUs typically include not only understandings on the rendering of
information assistance but also obligations concerning confidentiality and permissible uses
of information so obtained. Id. Technical assistance by the SEC may also be
contemplated. See id. at 231.
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offer regulation that issuers and investors want.61 Harmonization would
simply create an international “regulatory cartel,”62 susceptible to the
same inefficiencies that plague territorial regulatory monopolies.
In any event, competition and harmonization offer two opposing
alternatives to the unadorned application of national regulation to
international transactions.
B. Issuer Choice
The conflicts problems described above argue for some global
approach to securities regulation. According to its proponents, issuer
choice offers a regulatory structure that is both global in scope and
efficient.63 Under the current territorially-based approach to securities
regulation, each national regulatory agency enjoys something of a
“monopoly” in terms of the regulation it chooses to supply within its
jurisdiction. Issuers and investors wishing to transact are unavoidably
bound by the national securities laws of the jurisdiction in which they are
deemed to have transacted. This territorially determined choice of
securities regulatory regime may not be optimal for the parties to any
given transaction. Regulatory monopolists have insufficient incentive and
insufficient information to be able to offer optimal regulation.64 The
issuer choice solution is to untether national capital markets from their
respective national regulatory regimes, thereby breaking the regulatory
monopolies. Allowing issuers to choose their securities regulation forces
regulators to compete to supply regulation that transacting parties want.
The idea of issuer choice is in essence a spin-off from the U.S.
corporate charter competition model made popular by Romano and
others. The basic rationale for issuer choice parallels the rationale behind
U.S. corporate charter competition. Think of law as a product.
Competition among suppliers results in products that better satisfy
consumer preferences. As with state competition for corporate charters in
the United States, the argument goes, competition among nations’
securities regulators to meet consumer demand may produce more
efficient regulation.65

61.
Moreover, commentators have suggested that attempts at regulatory
harmonization are driven by national regulators’ desire to preserve their own authority
from dissipation, as targets of regulation exit to less heavily regulated jurisdictions. See
Colombatto & Macey, supra note 59, at 955.
62.
Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 390.
63.
See id. at 392-97; Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 916-17.
64.
See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 390-96.
65.
See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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The issuer choice approach solves the conflicts problem as well,
according to proponents. It leaves the global choice of law to each firm to
decide. Because the firm’s choice applies worldwide, conflicts do not
arise. The issuer choice promise, then, is not only for efficient regulation
but for efficient regulation on a global scale.66
1. ROMANO’S PROPOSAL
Romano’s initial issuer choice proposal focused primarily on U.S.
issuers in the U.S. securities market.67 She advocated that federal
regulation be optional, that U.S. states be allowed to offer competing
securities regulatory regimes, and that firms be allowed to choose from
among them. Firms could declare their choice of regime in their
corporate charters.68 Her proposal additionally included two investor
protections. First, the firm’s chosen regulatory regime would have to be
explicitly disclosed to investors.69 Second, the firm’s selected regime
could be changed only with shareholder approval.70
Romano has proposed to extend this approach internationally,
arguing generally that issuers should be allowed unrestrained choice in
terms of a regulatory regime.71 Romano does enumerate basic disclosure
requirements concerning the effects of international regime choice and the
nature of an issuer’s selected regime.72 She suggests that disclosure
specifically include notice that an investor’s domestic civil and criminal
liability rules would not necessarily apply to the investor’s transactions.73
In addition, if a firm’s selected regime did not include fraud liability or
financial disclosure requirements, or if the regime lacked the capacity to
prosecute violations of such rules, those deficiencies should also be
disclosed to prospective investors.74 Romano also echoes her requirement

66.
See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 914-16; Romano, Need for
Competition, supra note 10, at 389.
67.
See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 2361.
68.
Romano also considered the possibility that firms’ chosen securities law
would follow from their choice of state of incorporation. However, she concluded that an
independent choice of securities law most closely comports with a market approach. See
id. at 2410.
69.
Brokers would be required to inform prospective securities purchasers at the
time of purchase; issuers would be required to disclose in writing at the time of any public
offering; and the applicable regulation would have to be indicated on the security itself.
See id. at 2413.
70.
See id. at 2415.
71.
Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 390.
72.
Id. at 401.
73.
Id. at 401-02.
74.
Id.
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of shareholder approval for regime changes.75 Finally, Romano
anticipates that issuers, desiring to give international investors some
assurance as to issuers’ amenability to suit, would consent to suit in
appropriate fora in their offering and listing documents.76 Each nation’s
judiciary should therefore be instructed to respect these forum selection
clauses.77
2. “PORTABLE RECIPROCITY” OF CHOI & GUZMAN
Choi and Guzman conceptualize their proposal—“portable
reciprocity”—as a simple extension of existing bilateral recognition
agreements. Under the typical recognition or “passport” agreement, two
countries agree that a party from one country need only comply with its
home country regulation in order to be able to transact in the other “host”
country. Each party’s home country regulation in effect “travels” with it
for purposes of transacting in the host country.78 For example, the United
States and Canada have agreed to a Multijurisdictional Disclosure System
(MJDS), which basically permits a firm from either country to rely on its
home country disclosure documents when issuing securities in the other
country.79
Portable reciprocity extends this basic approach. Choi and Guzman
envision a regime of multilateral reciprocity, but instead of issuers being
able merely to travel with their home country rules, every issuer would be
permitted to choose the securities regulatory regime of any participating
country. The choice of regime would be recognized for the issuer’s
securities offered or traded in each participating country, regardless of the
nationality or domicile of the issuer or investor or the location of any
particular transaction.80 Like Romano, Choi and Guzman emphasize the

75.
Id at 401.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
See Frederick Tung, Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests:
Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in Corporate, Securities, and Bankruptcy Law,
3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 369 (2002) (discussing passport arrangements). Choi & Guzman refer to
these arrangements as “normal” reciprocity. Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 918 &
n.60.
79.
See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current
Registration and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6902,
Exchange Act Release No. 29,354, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2267, 56 Fed. Reg.
30,036 (July 1, 1991); Notice of National Policy Statement No. 45, 14 OSC Bull. 2844
(1991); see also Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 918 (describing MJDS); Tung, supra
note 78, at 378-79 (same).
80.
See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 922.
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importance of disclosing to investors the firm’s chosen regulatory
regime.81
3. ASSUMED INCENTIVES OF REGULATORS
Central to issuer choice proposals are the assumed incentives and
motivations of national regulators. According to these proposals,
bureaucracies thrive by expanding their reach, and in the case of securities
regulation, the number and size of firms being regulated, and the volume
of securities offerings and trading, are regulators’ maximands.82 Under
regulatory monopoly, regulators are too easily tempted to pursue their
own bureaucratic aggrandizement without regard for the public interest.83
Romano cites as one example the SEC’s repeated attempts to expand its
jurisdiction to include equity derivatives.84 By contrast, issuer choice
would force national regulatory regimes to compete with one another to
offer efficient regulatory “products”—those that would be popular with
issuers and investors. Competition, the argument goes, would effectively
harness regulators’ temptations toward bureaucratic aggrandizement in
the service of more efficient regulation. Regulators would be responsive
to the desires of issuers and investors because that would be their only
available avenue for augmenting their regulatory purview. Regulators
would aggressively push their products in order to expand their regulatory
authority and augment the importance of their agencies. They might also
charge fees for the use of their regulatory apparatus, thereby benefiting
the national fisc.
Besides the pursuit of direct bureaucratic benefits under issuer
choice, regulators might also wish to benefit important constituents in
order to obtain political support. Offering popular regulation would serve
that end as well. Because issuers choosing a country’s regime would also
likely offer their securities in that jurisdiction, successful sales of
regulation would result in an increase in the volume of securities sold and
traded nationally.85 The increase in securities activity redounds to the

81.
See id. at 926.
82.
“[R]egulators prefer to have within their jurisdiction more rather than fewer
regulated firms and transactions . . .” Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at
393 (citing WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 38-41 (1971)).
83.
Niskanen argues that the rational bureaucrat will seek to maximize her
bureau’s budget, even a bureaucrat motivated to pursue the public interest. See NISKANEN,
supra note 82, at 38.
84.
See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 399.
85.
See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 923. Issuers recognize that local
investors are likely to be most familiar with local regulation and most comfortable with
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benefit of both regulators and their important constituent, the national
securities industry. In addition, it would also increase the range of readily
available investment options for each nation’s investors.86 Moreover, the
successful establishment or expansion of a local financial center creates
jobs and generates tax revenues, further enhancing the prestige of the
regulators who oversee the industry.87 The current system, which ties
access to domestic capital markets to compliance with domestic
regulation, impedes capital flows. Issuer choice would allow issuers to
sell securities in each national jurisdiction without having to pay what is
effectively an “entry fee” in the form of national regulatory compliance.
4. OTHER REFINEMENTS
Besides appropriate incentives, an issuer choice regime would also
provide regulators with good information with which to design desirable
regulation. Individual decisions of issuers in choosing their regulatory
regimes would provide “market” information to regulators, who could
respond to their consumers by altering their regulatory products to
maximize adoptions. “[T]here will be a net flow of capital to firms
operating under the regimes investors prefer and, hence, a feedback
mechanism for regulators to ascertain which rules are cost effective.”88
By contrast, under the current territorial system, national regulators not
subject to competitive pressures do not have good information with which
to craft optimal rules.89
Issuer choice proponents are also confident that firm managers could
not use their regulatory choices to investors’ disadvantage. Efficient
capital markets can “price” the regulatory regimes selected, thereby
precluding managers from pursuing their own interests at the expense of
investors.90 For managers choosing regimes that provide insufficient
local enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, choosing local law is likely to enhance the
popularity of any particular offering among local investors. See id.
86.
See id. at 922.
87.
See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International
Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1861 (1997).
88.
Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 390.
89.
See id. For international bureaucracies attempting to negotiate uniform rules,
but not subject even to democratic accountability, the incentive and information problems
are even worse. See Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition: The
Search for Virtue, in U. VA. SCH. LAW, LEGAL STUDIES WORKING PAPERS SERIES 99-12
(June 1999).
90.
Romano notes:
In today's global financial markets, which are dominated by sophisticated
institutional investors, competition among securities regulators would not only
protect investors, both large and small, but also would provide a superior
regulatory regime. . . . In competitive capital markets, issuers of securities
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investor protections—for example, a regime may allow managerial
opportunism—their firms would suffer in the capital markets. Investors
would pay less for the securities of those issuers than if a more investorprotective regime had been selected.91 Because a firm’s managers desire
to minimize the firm’s costs of capital and maximize offering proceeds
and post-offer trading values, they would, given the choice, select the
regulatory regime that is optimal for the firm’s investors.
Where Romano and Choi and Guzman tend to differ is in the
direction they believe the competition will lead. Romano believes that
securities regulation will race to the top. For Romano, the starting point
for issuer choice in securities regulation is the declared triumph of U.S.
corporate charter competition. Free choice of firms’ states of
incorporation and facilitative conflicts rules create a national market for
corporate law, in which states are producers competing for consumers of
corporate law. According to Romano, this competition produces
corporate law that maximizes firm values and investors’ returns.92
Additionally, the same dynamics that have driven this race to the top can
be harnessed to produce optimal securities regulation. In her view,
competition over securities regulation will similarly cause regulatory
regimes to converge around the rules that issuers and investors want.93
Choi and Guzman are less convinced about convergence and
agnostic as to its direction. Instead, they posit the heterogeneity of issuers
and investors. Not all issuers are alike, so a regulatory regime that is
suitable for one may not be desirable to another. In their view, the beauty
have incentives to select regulatory regimes that protect investors from
exploitation by insiders, because such choices lower the cost of capital. Even
though individual investors may be poorly informed regarding what level of
disclosure or other protective mechanisms are necessary, because the
distribution of equity returns is pro-rated by share ownership and there is one
price for shares, informed institutional investors dictate the regulatory choices
of issuers and less-informed investors are thereby also protected.
Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 389; see also Romano, Empowering
Investors, supra note 10, at 2366-67. Choi has acknowledged that not all firms’ securities
trade in efficient markets. Responding to issuer choice critics, Choi proposes the
partitioning of markets in order to allow issuer choice to apply to that part of the market in
which it is most likely to function best. He would limit issuer choice to (i) “efficient
market” companies—those for which securities markets can accurately price regulatory
choices—and (ii) non-efficient market companies that agree to allow only sophisticated
investors to hold their securities. See Choi, supra note 17, at 818-19.
91.
See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 2366-67; Romano,
Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 493.
92.
Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 494.
93.
See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 2387. More recently,
Romano has considered the possibility that regulatory diversity would result, which would
stand to benefit heterogeneous issuers. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10,
at 395-96.
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of competition is that it generates regulatory diversity, allowing firms to
choose from an array of regulatory options, and allowing investors a
choice as to the regulatory regimes under which they will invest.94 In this
way, heterogeneous issuers and investors are more likely to be matched,
thereby eliminating the deadweight losses associated with territorially
imposed regulation.
C. Who Will Supply Choice of Law Rules?
To date, the debate over issuer choice has focused primarily on the
demand side—the behavior of firm managers and investors—and
whether issuer choice will work as predicted. Merritt Fox and Roberta
Romano have debated whether the existence of interfirm externalities
from corporate disclosure preclude firm managers from making socially
optimal regime choices.95 Jim Cox has expressed doubt that securities
markets can efficiently price differences among regulatory regimes.96
Echoing the debate over U.S. corporate charter competition,97 Romano
predicts a race to the top from issuer choice of securities regulation, while
Fox and Cox each predict a race to the bottom—that is, competition will
produce socially undesirable laws. And Choi and Guzman predict a
separating equilibrium, asserting that heterogeneity of issuers will result
in different jurisdictions offering different regulatory regimes to meet
issuers’ varying needs.

94.
See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 917.
95.
According to Fox, even absent agency problems, interfirm externalities cause
a divergence between a firm’s private marginal cost of disclosure and social marginal cost.
Because private cost will be higher than social cost at all levels of disclosure, managers
given a choice of disclosure regime will always choose a socially suboptimal level of
disclosure. Romano disputes these assertions, arguing among other things that the
presence of institutional investors internalizes any interfirm externalities. Compare Fox,
Political Economy, supra note 19, at 749, and Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities
Disclosure, supra note 19, at 1345, and Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, supra note 19,
with Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10. Fox also argues that including public
choice considerations in the analysis shows that an international race to the bottom may
result. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 793. He proposes his own novel
allocation of regulatory jurisdiction, arguing that it should be based on issuer nationality.
A country should regulate only its domestic issuers, those whose “economic center of
gravity” is located there. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing
Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2506 (1997).
96.
See Cox, supra note 20, at 1234.
97.
See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
(1993) (arguing that competition for corporate charters among U.S. states has resulted in
more efficient corporate law overall); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (asserting that result of
corporate charter competition has been a “race for the bottom”).
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The supply side of issuer choice, however—the story of how
regulators and other government suppliers of law behave—has not been
much questioned.98 For issuer choice proponents, both the diagnosis of
the disease of regulatory “monopoly” and its antidote rely on standard
public choice assumptions—that regulators regulate in order to garner
rents for themselves and favored constituencies.99 Under regulatory
monopoly, the analysis goes, regulators have insufficient incentive to be
responsive to the needs of issuers and investors. Once forced to compete,
however, regulators’ survival and their ability to benefit important
constituents will depend on designing efficient products—i.e., rules that
issuers and investors want.
A basic question exists, however, concerning the international
framework for competition. Incentives to supply socially optimal
regulation would operate according to issuer choice predictions only if
regulators truly competed in a well-functioning market for securities law.
But they don’t. Analysts on all sides have focused on substantive rules
and the dynamics of competition over those rules.100 But they have
ignored the fact that competition over substantive rules requires
international cooperation in structuring the market in which states would
compete.101 In fact, the political actors that would in theory compete over
substantive securities law under issuer choice—regulators and other law
givers—are also the ones whose cooperation and support would be
required to create the market at the outset.
Regulators or other law givers would have to agree to a choice of law
rule honoring firms’ private choice. Each state would have to give up its
traditional territorial jurisdiction for its securities law, and agree instead to
apply whatever law a firm might choose. Issuer choice proponents have
failed to explain how the global market for law will come to pass or who

98.
As such, issuer choice is of a piece with the competitive federalism literature
that relies on “efficiency-driven, demand-side arguments that assume away politics and
institutions . . . . Missing from the . . . literature is a treatment of the institutional supply
side.” Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?,
83 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1532 (1997).
99.
See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
101. “[T]he formal prerequisite of a cooperative approach to regulatory
competition is the existence of a consensus about either the enforceability of explicit
choices of law or the content of choice-of-law rules that turn on transactional forms that
parties can manipulate.” Stephan, supra note 89, at 12. Moreover, stable equilibria
cannot occur without some sort of centralized institutional framework to facilitate
competition. See Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction
in International Securities Regulation, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION 289, 294 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001).
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will have sufficient incentive to supply the right choice of law rules. The
market just exists.102
Because the requisite choice of law rules for international issuer
choice do not exist, nations would have to supply it.103 Analysts of
regulatory competition do not typically think of this as a problem of
supply. Working from the model of U.S. federalism, the framework for
competition is already in place. Therefore, the rules needed to create it
are not regarded as part of the product states offer. But with the move
from U.S. federalism to international competition, the nature of the
product must change in this fundamental way to include facilitative
choice of law rules.
What incentives would regulators have to supply this critical
element? Ironically, the very incentives that would theoretically drive
regulators to vigorous competition on substantive regulation—assuming
an international framework for competition already existed—would likely
also drive them to resist competition in the first place. If all the world’s
securities regulators could agree to respect firms’ private choice, then the
pursuit of bureaucratic aggrandizement might cause each regulator to
respond to consumer preferences in order to maximize the number of
firms under her regulatory authority. But even if that were true, it would
not explain why regulators would willingly surrender their regulatory
monopolies in the first place. Why would a monopolist—regulatory or
otherwise—prefer competition to a cozy monopoly? For the regulatory
monopolist intent on the pursuit of bureaucratic aggrandizement, giving
up the monopoly in favor of competition would seem an odd way to
102. Choi and Guzman merely posit international agreements implementing the
appropriate choice-of-law rules. Likewise, Romano simply assumes national actors—
executives and legislatures—in each jurisdiction would sign the right treaties to require
states to respect private choice of foreign securities law. “Mutual recognition of statutory
securities domicile would . . . have to be effectuated by a treaty or other executive
agreement . . . . This undoubtedly complicates the implementation of a competitive
international regime.” Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 398. Romano
recognizes the theoretical possibility that the SEC could exercise its exemptive powers to
create competition. See id. Alan Palmiter has made the same suggestion. See Alan R.
Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1.
However, given Romano’s assumptions about SEC incentives, she justifiably doubts that
it would do so. She ultimately recognizes that some form of legislative or executive action
would be necessary to create a competitive regime. See Romano, Need for Competition,
supra note 10, at 398. Despite this bifurcation of regulatory versus national officials, it
remains a supply problem, albeit involving different officials that also have significant
influence over the texture of securities law. And no theory has addressed this problem.
103. “Within the U.S. federal system, stability is provided by the ability of the
federal government to intercede; this is an important distinction between regulatory
competition in the U.S. domestic context and regulatory competition in the international
context. In the international context, we must build and empower a central authority.”
Trachtman, supra note 101, at 295.
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proceed. Surely a move from monopoly to competition can only threaten
the assumed goals of the maximizing bureaucrat. As I explain below, the
maximizing bureaucrat’s more likely strategy is to pursue regulatory price
discrimination like a good monopolist.
Once we acknowledge that the emergence of appropriate choice of
law rules cannot simply be treated as exogenous, but must be endogenous
to our model, then providing a consistent description of regulators’
incentives that results in the emergence of both an international
framework for competition and competition over substantive rules
becomes quite tricky. Whether such a story can be told is doubtful.
To be sure, regulators—as distinct from legislators and executive
officials—may not necessarily enjoy a veto power over these choice of
law rules and whether a competitive system is realized. In all likelihood,
legislative and executive action would be required to achieve the
necessary international cooperation in any event.104 However, regulators
not only design substantive rules; they may also have significant influence
over the jurisdictional scope of their substantive law products.105
Regulators’ opposition to issuer choice would surely make
implementation more difficult politically.106 Moreover, recognizing the
necessity of legislative and executive action simply moves the question to
a higher level. Under what circumstances would national officials be
willing to supply the right choice of law rules for regulatory competition?
In Parts II and III of this Article, I discuss these questions about the
incentives and constraints of regulators and other lawmakers with respect
to issuer choice. Before proceeding to those analyses, I briefly discuss
corporate charter competition in the United States and the choice of law
rule that emerged among U.S. states to facilitate it. I suggest important
conditions that led to its emergence, and I distinguish those conditions
from the current international setting for securities regulation. As earlier
noted, the model of U.S. corporate charter competition figures
prominently in the affirmative case made for issuer choice. However, the
U.S. and international settings are different in important respects. That
facilitative choice of law rules could emerge among U.S. states thus
portends little for the prospects of similar developments for international
issuer choice.

104. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 399-400.
105. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 13, at 209 (discussing SEC approaches to
extraterritorial jurisdiction concerning securities offerings and antifraud rules).
106. See infra Part III.A.

1388

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
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Under U.S. corporate charter competition, the internal affairs rule
enables the competition that exists. While each state offers its own
corporation law, states generally accept and apply the so-called internal
affairs rule for their choice of law regarding a corporation’s internal
affairs—the relations among a firm’s shareholders and managers.107
Under this rule, the firm’s chosen corporation law will govern its internal
affairs, regardless of the location of the firm’s headquarters, assets, or
personnel, regardless of where particular transactions occur or particular
persons reside.108 Therefore, a firm may incorporate under
the
corporation law of any state, and its choice will be respected in other
states. This common respect for firm choice effectively creates a
common market for corporate law. States act as producers competing
nationwide for consumers of corporate law. Because states may garner
significant fees with successful sales of corporate charters, as well as
benefit local constituents, they have some incentive to offer corporate law
that firm managers and investors prefer. According to regulatory
competition advocates, this competition among states produces corporate
law that maximizes firm values and investors’ returns.109
Moving to the international context, however, no mechanism like the
internal affairs rule exists. That consensus could emerge among U.S.
states regarding the internal affairs rule does not imply that a similar
choice of law rule and competitive framework could spontaneously
develop internationally for securities regulation. The background
conditions are dissimilar.
U.S. states are of course part of a federal system governed under the
Constitution, and no similar institutional framework exists for
independent nations. Scholars disagree as to the relative importance of
Constitutional influences on the evolution of the internal affairs rule.110
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 302(2) (1971); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 15.05(c) (1984).
108. A handful of states—California and New York most notably—impose their
own local requirements on certain foreign corporations as to certain issues. See CAL.
CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1317-1320
(West 1986 & Supp. 2002).
109. See ROMANO, supra note 97, at 14-51. Recent scholarship has questioned
whether states actually do compete for charters. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Debate on State
Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).
110. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional
Freedom, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325, 333 (F.H. Buckley ed.,
1999).
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However, even on the most decentralized, bottom-up view of things—that
each state unilaterally and independently arrived at the internal affairs
rule—Constitutional guaranties of unimpeded interstate commerce played
a critical role. According to this view, in the absence of state-by-state
trade barriers, firms could generally avoid unattractive corporate law by
simply relocating out of an unattractive jurisdiction, while continuing to
sell products into the unfriendly jurisdiction.111 This relatively easy exit
option meant that a state had little to gain and something to lose—in
terms of local tax base, business opportunities, employment, and other
positive spillovers—by attempting to impose local corporate law in the
face of a firm’s election of another state’s law. Therefore, local interests
in each state would have favored local recognition of out-of-state
incorporation, supporting the internal affairs rule and precluding the
formation of interest groups favoring territoriality in corporate law.112 On
this view, put simply, the threat of firms’ physical exit to avoid a state’s
undesirable corporate law forced each state to offer virtual exit—
avoidance of the unattractive local law without the need for physical
exit—through adoption of the internal affairs rule.113
Historically, however, different conditions have obtained for firm
mobility and securities law recognition in the international context. It
should not surprise, therefore, that interest group alignments for securities
law recognition among nations would have developed quite differently
from the case of corporation law among U.S. states. Firms historically
have not enjoyed nearly the physical mobility internationally that they
enjoy within the United States. Their headquarters and key operations,
employees, relationships, goodwill, and assets are not readily transplanted
internationally without significant loss of value. Moreover, firms would
typically have had difficulty avoiding application of their home country
securities laws. Because the costs of capital are likely to be lowest at
111. Territorial application of local corporate law typically involves rules to
protect local investors, and exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is typically based on the
predominance of firm assets, employees, sales, income, or investors in the prescribing
jurisdiction. See supra note 108 and sources cited therein.
112. See William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate
Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 312 (1997); Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 110.
Comparing the U.S. federal system with company law within the European Community
(EC), Carney has detailed the link between the lack of competition among EC countries
and interest group influences resulting in harmonization of interest group protections
through EC company law directives. See Carney, supra, at 318.
113. States’ other obvious alternative—reforming the unattractive aspects of their
corporate laws—has apparently also been pursued. Scholars have noted the substantial
uniformity across states’ corporate law statutes. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 588 (1990); Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225, 235 (1985).
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home,114 firms issuing securities generally cannot avoid issuing in their
home jurisdictions.115 It is this “hometown” effect that guaranties the
regulatory monopolies that issuer choice proponents condemn. Bound to
their home country securities markets, firms are likewise bound to home
country securities law. Home country interests with economic stakes in
preserving and promoting home country securities activity—for example,
stock exchanges and investment banks—would not have felt threatened
by the possibility of firm exit. Lawmakers would therefore not have felt
any local pressure to offer virtual exit—in the form of issuer choice—to
forestall firms’ physical exit. There would have been no push to forsake
territorial securities law in deference to firms’ alternative choices.
Instead, as I argue below, just the opposite has occurred. Within
each independent nation, the operation of a national securities regulatory
regime, combined with the historical difficulties of firms’ physical exit
from their home jurisdictions, would not surprisingly produce important
interest groups with stakes in territorial regulation.116 These interest
groups—as well as regulators—will wish to preserve regulatory
monopoly, making issuer choice unlikely.117
II. REGULATORS’ CALCULUS
Assuming that regulators were not public regarding but only
rationally self-interested, it is far from clear that regulators in any country
would willingly give up their territorial monopolies to open competition.
114. A firm’s capital costs are likely to be lowest in its home country because
home country investors are likely to enjoy informational advantages over foreign investors
with respect to assessing the firm’s value and prospects. See Fox, Political Economy,
supra note 19, at 770-71 (“Despite the burden of compliance, avoiding the U.S. market
traditionally has not made sense for U.S. issuers since the United States is the residence of
a large portion of their most likely potential investors.”); Romano, supra note 10, at 2397
(“[R]esort solely to foreign capital markets for financing is not a viable option for publicly
traded U.S. firms.”). Under the EU’s “passport” system for securities listings and public
offerings, a firm could choose a regulatory regime other than that of its home state by
making its initial offering in another member state. But “[i]n reality, very few issuers
apparently choose to list outside of their home country given that issuers often find the
warmest reception for their securities in their home markets.” Jackson & Pan, supra note
32, at 678-79 & n.70.
115. For a discussion of the exceptional case of Israeli high-tech firms avoiding
the Israeli securities market, see infra Part II.D. This exceptional situation would most
typically involve firms from a country with a small and unattractive securities market,
what I term a “regulatory price-taking” jurisdiction. See infra Part III.B.
116. Not only do interest groups affect policies, but policies may also produce
interest groups. See Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and
Political Change, 45 WORLD POLITICS 595 (1993) (noting that “policies produce politics”).
117. See infra Part III.B.
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A regulator would accept issuer choice and abandon territorial choice of
law rules only if she could be confident ex ante that her prospective
private benefits under issuer choice—in terms of bureaucratic
aggrandizement and the ability to favor important domestic interest
groups—would exceed those under her existing monopoly.118
A regulator enjoying a healthy monopoly would be unlikely to prefer
the vagaries of competition under issuer choice. She would have to be
extremely confident in the ability of her domestic regime to compete
internationally in terms of selling her regulatory product.119 In addition,
she would have to be amenable to the loss of political slack that would
result from regulatory competition.120 Assuming a risk averse regulator
further narrows the possibilities for choice of law arrangements leading to
competition.
On the other hand, against their druthers, some regulators might be
forced to compete. As with any monopoly, a regulator’s market power
may be dissipated by technological or other innovations. With securities
transactions, the increased mobility of issuers and investors may enable
their figurative exit from particular jurisdictions with unattractive
regulatory or other characteristics. Traditionally, issuers and investors
transacted primarily or exclusively in their home jurisdictions, where they
were most familiar with the overall business and investment climate—
law, custom, language, culture, currency, and the like. Israeli firms issued
their securities in Israel; Japanese investors bought securities of Japanese
issuers in Japan.121 However, especially for countries with small, illiquid
118. As for social benefits, playing issuer choice might be a positive-sum game
globally. As issuer choice proponents argue, marginal issuers that might not be willing or
able to issue securities under a territorially-based system might be able to find a desirable
regulatory regime under issuer choice, such that increased issuing and trading volumes
would result. And investors would benefit from expanded investment opportunities.
However, according to our public choice assumptions, territorially-based regulators care
only about their private benefits, so a regulator would be unmoved by appeals to social
benefits. She would support issuer choice only if she could be confident it would augment
her private benefits.
119. Regulators may in addition embrace inertia for behavioral reasons. Loss
aversion from regret avoidance may cause individuals unduly to favor the status quo. See
Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological
Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998). Regulators are
not immune from this status quo bias. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure:
A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1056 (2000) (pointing out that regulators
must be “endogenized” in any analysis seeking to rely on law to correct bias-induced
market failures). But organizations may to some extent perform a “debiasing” role. See
Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for
Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. IN ORG’L BEHAV. 1 (1998).
120. Cf. Levine & Forrence, infra note 187 (discussing political slack that allows
regulators to favor private interests).
121. See supra note 114.
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securities markets, the increasing mobility of local issuers and investors
may enable them to find acceptable substitutes outside their home
jurisdictions. A regulator in such a jurisdiction may be forced to compete
to some extent as her market power wanes.
In this Part, I examine the incentives of regulators to bring about the
envisioned international issuer choice regime. In particular, I discuss
regulators’ incentives with respect to choice of law rules, the structuring
of which could either facilitate or impede regulatory competition.
Adopting the assumptions of issuer choice proponents regarding
regulators’ incentives,122 I not only show that regulators would oppose
adoption of rules recognizing private choice—a prospect that issuer
choice advocates have already noted123—but I also describe their optimal
strategies in pursuing their assumed maximands. Treating regulation as a
“price” that regulators charge for access to their national capital markets, I
discuss the differing strategies of regulators from “price-setting” and
“price-taking” jurisdictions. In particular, regulators in price-setting
jurisdictions will adopt a strategy of regulatory price discrimination, a
strategy inconsistent with issuer choice.
A. Regulatory Monopoly and Regulation as Price
Because territorially-based securities regulation ties capital markets
to national regulatory regimes, we can think of regulation as a “price” that
a national regulator charges issuers in order to have their securities issued
and traded in the national market.124 For each issuer, we may assume that
an optimal set of securities regulations exists that maximizes firm
value.125 Call that the issuer’s “regulatory ideal.”126 To the extent that a
nation’s actual regulatory regime diverges from an issuer’s regulatory
ideal, the regulation is by definition value-decreasing. It effectively
122. The supposition that lawmakers would be sufficiently motivated to compete
has not gone uncontested. See Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The Role of
Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 141 (2000); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594, 605-06 (1980); see also supra note 109
and sources cited therein.
123. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 399.
124. Cf. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1525
(1984) (defining a price as a payment of money that is required in order to do what is
permitted).
125. This definition assumes away the possibility of agency costs that could
preclude an issuer from desiring value-maximizing law. Cf. Choi & Guzman, supra note
87, at 1864 (defining regulatory ideal within a country as the regulation issuers and
investors within the country would choose if they could costlessly contract).
126. Whether the regulatory ideals for various issuers converge or diverge does
not matter for our purposes.
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exacts a price from the issuer for the privilege of engaging in securities
activities within the jurisdiction.
As so described, a “high” price would not necessarily reflect
overregulation, but a large difference between the regulatory ideal and the
actual regulation. A regime that is too lax might therefore exact a high
regulatory price, as well as a regime that is too stringent. Remaining true
to our assumptions about regulators’ incentives, however, issuer choice
advocates generally assume that the degree of actual regulation—at least
in important jurisdictions—exceeds the regulatory ideal.127 Pursuit of
bureaucratic aggrandizement causes regulators to err on the side of
overregulation, not under regulation. For present purposes, we may adopt
this perspective and assume that regulators will attempt to charge as high
a price as possible on the side of overregulation.128
Treating national regulation as the price of entry into a national
securities market, we may further observe that national markets are not all
equally attractive. Some are more attractive than others, and this will
affect their regulatory pricing strategies. Although each national regulator
probably enjoys some degree of market power, primarily with respect to
local issuers and investors, improved investor and issuer mobility may
diminish regulators’ market power even as to these traditionally captured
consumers. Especially for issuers and investors from countries with
small, illiquid national markets, modern telecommunications and other
technological innovations may offer access to more intrinsically attractive
capital markets. As acceptable substitutes for the local securities market
become available, the national regulator’s market power diminishes and
her regulatory monopoly becomes contested. Suboptimal regulation may
drive issuers and investors to figuratively exit their home jurisdictions—
issuers by offering and listing their securities in other national markets,
and investors by transacting in foreign exchanges or other offshore
markets. Jurisdictions that find their regulatory monopolies threatened in
this way may have to adjust their regulatory pricing in response to market
127. For example, Romano has repeatedly questioned the need for the SEC’s
mandatory disclosure regime. See ROMANO, supra note 97, at 93; Romano, Empowering
Investors, supra note 10, at 2373; Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 465.
Likewise, Choi & Guzman doubt the promise of international cooperation in securities
regulation because of concerns that national regulators might “take over” international
agreements, “adding provisions and increasing the complexity of the regime to enhance
the importance of the regulatory agencies.” Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 915-16.
128. The ability to charge an infinitely high price will be constrained not only by
market forces but also by politics. Issuers’ costs of political action—for example, resort to
legislative relief from overregulation by the bureaucracy—become relatively more
attractive as regulatory pricing increases. So both exit and voice will serve to constrain
regulatory pricing. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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pressures. These jurisdictions may usefully be characterized as regulatory
“price-taking” jurisdictions.129
By contrast, for national markets without close substitutes—such as
the U.S. market—the national regulator will continue to enjoy a healthy
degree of market power. These we may characterize as regulatory “pricesetting” jurisdictions. These jurisdictions have sufficiently attractive
capital markets that they can attract issuers and investors without
necessarily also having to offer a particularly attractive regulatory regime.
Their attractive capital markets allow them some market power. They are
not subject to severe competitive pressure in terms of their regulatory
pricing. Price-taking jurisdictions, on the other hand, run much greater
risks that unattractive regulatory burdens will drive issuers away from
their national markets to others offering more attractive pricing.130 I first
discuss the United States as an exemplar of price-setting jurisdictions.
Price-taking jurisdictions are discussed below in Part II.D.
B. Regulatory Monopoly and Regulatory Price Discrimination
The size and depth of the U.S. capital market enable the United
States to attract issuers and investors, even if the U.S. regulatory regime is
suboptimal—that is, even if the regulatory price is set too high.
According to issuer choice proponents, regulators therefore have
insufficient incentive to adopt more efficient regulations—which in effect
would lower the price.131 But this is exactly the reason U.S. regulators
will oppose competition and the choice of law rules required to bring it
about. As a regulatory price-setting jurisdiction, the United States does
not necessarily need to “win”—or even compete—in any international
competition. Its bread-and-butter clientele—made up of U.S. issuers and
investors—is largely captive.132
129. See Amir N. Licht, David’s Dilemma: A Case Study of Securities Regulation
in a Small Open Market, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 673 (2001). Adjustments to
regulation may not be the only tool available to these jurisdictions. Competition to attract
securities activity may take whatever form is useful for making the national securities
market more appealing to issuers. Indirect subsidies to local underwriters, for example,
might facilitate and encourage local offerings.
130. Most countries in the world fall into this latter category. These typologies of
price setters and price takers are crude, of course, but distinguishing them bluntly enables
us also to distinguish clearly the different incentives and constraints at work.
131. Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 919.
132. “Despite the burden of compliance, avoiding the U.S. market traditionally
has not made sense for U.S. issuers since the United States is the residence of a large
portion of their most likely potential investors.” Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at
770-71. Of course, if the price is exorbitant, that simply makes other alternatives
relatively more attractive. For example, private placements or overseas offerings are
always options, and in any event, both are likely to become more attractive over time.
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The sources of attraction of the U.S. securities market are well
known. It is the largest, deepest, and most liquid market in the world,
providing issuers with the largest national pool of investors.133 Having
shares sold and traded in the U.S. market offers increased prestige and
visibility for any issuer—for its securities and possibly for its products as
well. For U.S. issuers especially, the U.S. market is likely to be the most
attractive. Besides its sheer size and liquidity, the pool of U.S. investors
is likely to be the cheapest source of capital for U.S. issuers, as domestic
investors enjoy lower information and transaction costs than their foreign
counterparts. U.S. issuers and investors share common understandings
about the business and investment environment in the United States, as do
local issuers and investors in most nations. They share a common
language and culture. U.S. investors have natural advantages over foreign
investors in terms of accessing and analyzing information about U.S.
issuers. U.S. investors and their information intermediaries have better
access to corporate executives and other informed sources than their
foreign counterparts.134 Because of these advantages, all else equal, U.S.
investors will generally be willing and able to outbid foreign investors for
their stakes in U.S. firms. In addition, because the most convenient
market for U.S. investors is the domestic market, U.S. issuers will wish to
be there as well. U.S. issuers will naturally prefer the U.S. market to
others. Their demand for access to the U.S. securities market, then, is
inelastic. They have no close substitute, so the SEC enjoys market power
as to them.135 “[R]esort solely to foreign capital markets for financing is
not a viable option for publicly traded U.S. firms.”136
In addition, the large and liquid market will attract noncaptive issuers
as well. Many of the advantages described above apply for foreign
issuers as well. Whether U.S. securities laws are optimal or not, many
foreign firms will still wish to issue their securities in the U.S. market.
Moreover, given the assumed incentives of regulators to expand the
jurisdictional reach of national securities laws and to maximize the
number of firms and transactions within their regulatory purview, the
SEC would seem to best pursue those ends by retaining the regulatory

133. U.S. exchanges also provide superior order execution. See Amar Bhide,
Efficient Markets, Deficient Governance, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 128-29.
134. Foreign investors can and certainly do hire U.S. information intermediaries.
However, all else equal, U.S. investors will also have better information on quality
differences among U.S. intermediaries. See generally Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors
Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279, 290-96 (2000) (discussing
benefits and risks of relying on information intermediaries).
135. This will likely remain true at least for the medium term. However, given
the increasing mobility of both investors and issuers, all predictions must be tentative.
136. Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 2397.
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monopoly it already has over domestic issuers,137 while also attempting to
attract new business from those marginal issuers otherwise outside the
reach of the monopoly—that is, foreign issuers. The foreign issuer is the
marginal issuer with price sensitivity, so the SEC has incentive to
accommodate the foreign issuer on pricing. The domestic issuer is much
less price sensitive and so will not receive the same accommodation.
Differential pricing makes sense because it enables the regulator to
increase the number of firms under its regulatory purview, which serves
its goal of bureaucratic aggrandizement. Many foreign issuers may be
unwilling to pay the regulatory price charged to U.S. issuers for access to
the U.S. securities market. Without the same “hometown” attachment to
the U.S. market that affects U.S. firms, foreign issuers naturally have
other ready alternatives for their capital raising. Because of foreign
issuers’ higher elasticity of demand for access to the U.S. market, the
maximizing regulator should charge them a lower price than that charged
to domestic issuers.138 The regulator will price discriminate among
consumers.139 Below I first explain the general conditions for price
discrimination, and then describe price discrimination in U.S. securities
regulation.
1. CONDITIONS FOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION
According to its standard economic definition, price discrimination is
a strategy of nonuniform pricing through which firms with market power
maximize profits.140 Translating into the regulatory realm, access to the
national securities market is the “product,” which the issuer purchases
from the regulator by paying the specified regulatory price. We might say
the regulator increases its bureaucratic “profits” when it can expand its

137. As critics of issuer choice have observed, however, even under regulatory
“monopoly,” issuers have choices. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of
Securities Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 549-53
(2001).
138. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 137 (1988).
139. Romano observes, for instance, that while the SEC is willing to lower
disclosure requirements for foreign issuers in order to attract their listings to the U.S.
market, it has consistently increased the disclosure requirements for domestic issuers. See
Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 399. Niskanen noted the possibility that
certain bureaucracies would be able to price discriminate among customers. See
NISKANEN, supra note 82, at 34. See generally DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M.
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 287 (3d. ed. 1999) (discussing price
discrimination); TIROLE, supra note 138, at 133-52 (same).
140. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 139, at 274.
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“output”—allowing one more issuer to access the national capital
market—while pricing above marginal cost for this access.141
In general, the strategy is only available if three conditions are met.
First, the seller—in this case, the regulator as the seller of access to its
domestic securities market—must enjoy some market power. Otherwise,
any attempt to charge consumers more than a competitive price would
fail.142 Second, the seller must know or be able to infer consumers’
willingness to pay for each unit of the good or service at issue. In other
words, the seller must be able to identify the consumers willing to pay the
higher price.143 And finally, conditions must be such that arbitrage is
precluded. That is, purchasers paying the lower price should not be able
to resell the product. Otherwise, those paying the lower price could resell
to the high-price purchasers, creating competition for the seller, driving
down the price toward the nondiscriminatory monopoly price, and
frustrating the seller’s attempt to discriminate.144
Each of these conditions obtains for the SEC and regulators in other
price-setting jurisdictions. First, as a regulator in a price-setting
jurisdiction, the SEC by definition enjoys market power. Second, as for
distinguishing among consumers, grouping firms into “domestic” and
“foreign” serves as a useful proxy for those with low and high elasticities
of demand. Securities regulators generally have no difficulty
distinguishing domestic issuers from foreign. Even multinational firms
typically have an identifiable “center of gravity,” based on the location of
their headquarters, the nationality of their executive officers and other
employees, the location of their principal assets, and the like.145 The SEC
definition of “foreign private issuer,” for example, relies on these factors
in determining which firms are sufficiently foreign so as to qualify for

141. Cf. id. (explaining incentives for price discrimination). Marginal cost may
be an elusive concept in this context, as the regulator does not actually make the product.
On the other hand, the character of the national market is undoubtedly shaped in some
measure by the applicable securities regulation, such that the regulation itself can be
considered an integral part of the product. And supplying the regulation and enforcing it
as to each issuer does have costs. From that perspective, it would seem that the marginal
cost of supplying the product to a foreign issuer is at least as high as for a domestic issuer,
so that a lower regulatory price for foreign issuers could not be explained on the basis of
lower marginal costs. Instead, reducing the price for the foreign issuer would seem a
useful strategy for maximizing bureaucratic profits, provided the price still exceeds
marginal cost.
142. Absent some market power, a producer faces a perfectly flat demand curve.
In a perfectly competitive market, a producer that tries to charge more than the market
price for its product loses all its customers to its competitors. Id.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 733.
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more lenient regulatory treatment in the United States.146 Moreover, even
if some doubt existed as to the firm’s “nationality,” there would likely be
only two contending alternatives. Regulators will not have difficulty
identifying high price and low price consumers.147
Finally, as for the possibility of arbitrage, it is unlikely that a foreign
firm would be able somehow to transfer its preferential access or foreign
status to a domestic firm for purposes of selling securities in the domestic
market. Securities regulators’ careful selection of criteria for
distinguishing foreign from domestic firms would preclude a foreign firm
from “fronting” for a domestic firm.
2. PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES
As the preceding discussion would predict, for several decades, the
SEC through its rulemaking authority has reduced disclosure and other
regulatory requirements for foreign issuers in the U.S. market as
compared to their U.S. counterparts.148 Perhaps no single theory of
regulatory behavior provides a complete explanation for this trend, but a
public choice/price discrimination story is plausible.
Foreign issuers—that is, those qualifying as “foreign private
issuers”149—enjoy more relaxed requirements when it comes to offering
their securities in the U.S. In a public offering, for example, their
disclosure obligations concerning management compensation, material
transactions, and lines of business are less stringent than for domestic

146. See infra Part II.B.2. Any corporation incorporated or organized under the
laws of any foreign country qualifies as a foreign private issuer, unless both (a) more than
50% of its outstanding voting securities are held of record directly or indirectly by U.S.
residents; and (b) either (i) the majority of its executive officers or directors are U.S.
citizens or residents, (ii) over 50% of its assets are located in the United States, or (iii) its
business is administered principally in the United States. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c).
147. This type of group-based discrimination is third-degree price discrimination.
CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 139, at 280, 284. The seller has insufficient information
to be able to identify each consumer’s individual reservation price. Id. at 284. But the
seller does have sufficient information to be able to separate consumers into groups and
charge different prices to the different groups. Id. If the seller could make particularized
distinctions and charge each consumer her reservation price, then that would be perfect or
first-degree price discrimination. Id. at 280.
148. Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 44-54 (enumerating various reduced regulatory hurdles for
foreign issuers). Curiously, Howell Jackson characterizes this trend as a sort of
“Delawarization” of securities law. Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and
Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 649, 658 (2001).
While these SEC rules relax U.S. regulatory requirements for foreign issuers, they hardly
facilitate free choice.
149. See supra note 146.
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issuers.150 In adopting special, less demanding public offering registration
forms for use only by foreign issuers, the SEC expressly recognized that
“imposition on foreign issuers of the same disclosure standards applicable
to domestic issuers could discourage offerings of foreign securities in the
United States.”151 Foreign issuers also enjoy easier access to private U.S.
capital markets under Rule 144A than their domestic counterparts.152
Their offshore offerings under Regulation S are not subject to the same
restrictions that apply to U.S. issuers.153 Foreign issuers additionally
enjoy special exemptions related to cross-border tender offers, business
combinations, and rights offerings.154 They enjoy special accommodation
from the SEC with respect to scheduling needs and confidential treatment
of filings.155
Foreign issuers are also exempt from many of the rules to which
domestic issuers are subject when they list shares on a national securities
exchange.156 Foreign issuers are exempt from most of the proxy rules.157
150. See Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act
Release No. 6437, SEC Docket (CCH), at 964 (Nov. 19, 1982) (adopting Forms F-1, F-2,
and F-3 in extending integrated disclosure to foreign issuers).
151. Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign Private Issuers, Securities Act
Release No. 6360, 24 SEC Docket (CCH), at 3, 4 (Nov. 20, 1981) (proposing forms F-1,
F-2, and F-3). In weighing the public interest, the SEC characterized reduced disclosure
for foreign issuers as beneficial insofar as it expanded investment opportunities for U.S.
investors. See id.
152. Rule 144A allows for resale of restricted securities to qualified institutional
buyers. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2002). However, the benefits of Rule 144A for
domestic issuers are limited by the fact that it is unavailable with respect to any class of
security that is traded on a U.S. public market. See id. Domestic issuers would therefore
be unable to issue common stock to institutional investors in reliance on Rule 144A.
Foreign issuers, by contrast, are much less likely to be affected by this restriction. Even a
foreign issuer whose common stock is publicly traded on a major foreign exchange may
issue common stock in the United States to qualified institutional buyers under 144A, as
long as its stock is not also listed on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ.
153. See Rule 903(b)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3); Rule 905, 17 C.F.R. §
230.905; see also supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation S).
154. See Cross-Border Tender and Exchange Offers, Business Combinations, and
Rights Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7,759, Exchange Act Release No. 45,054,
[1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,214 at 82,536 (Oct. 26, 1999).
155. See EDWARD F. GREENE, ET AL., 1 U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVE MARKETS, at 2-45 n. 45 (1999).
156. These rules are promulgated by the SEC pursuant to its authority under the
Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78bbbb.
In general, an issuer without publicly listed shares is also required to register under
the Exchange Act and be subject to Exchange Act rules if its assets exceed $10 million
and it has a class of equity security with at least 500 holders of record. See supra note 55.
However, a foreign private issuer without publicly listed shares is exempt from Exchange
Act registration and rules if it has no class of equity with more than 300 holders resident in
the United States, or if it furnishes to the SEC the disclosure information provided in its
home jurisdiction. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.12g3-2(a) to (b).
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Foreign issuers and their insiders are excused from the reporting
obligations and short-swing profit rules under Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.158 Their periodic disclosure obligations are less
stringent than those applied to domestic issuers. For example, foreign
issuers file annual reports on Form 20-F, the requirements of which are
somewhat less demanding than the annual reporting requirements
applicable to domestic issuers.159 Foreign issuers are excused from filing
10-Qs, the quarterly disclosures that apply to domestic issuers.160 In
addition, the SEC has recently proposed to relieve foreign issuers from
the current requirement of having to reconcile their financial statements to
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (U.S. GAAP). Foreign
issuers would instead be permitted to do their financial reporting under
international accounting standards promulgated by the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC),161 which are less demanding
than U.S. GAAP.162
Domestic issuers might certainly gripe about this differential
treatment. However, given their inelastic demand for access to the U.S.
157. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3.
158. Id.
159. See Jackson & Pan, supra note 32, at 666. In addition, a foreign private
issuer has six months after the end of its fiscal year to file its 20-F report, whereas the
quarterly and annual reports due from domestic issuers must be filed within three months
after the end of the fiscal quarter or year. The requirements of Form 20-F conform to
international disclosure standards adopted by IOSCO. International Disclosure Standards,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7745, 70 SEC Docket (CCH) at 1993 (Sept. 28, 1999)
(adopting release); International Disclosure Standards; Correction, Securities Act Release
No. 33-7983, 75 SEC Docket (CCH) at 522 (June 11, 2001) (correction).
160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3. Instead, a foreign private issuer reports on Form 6K, which contains information which has been made publicly available in the home
jurisdiction. Id. § 230.13a-16. This information is not considered “filed” and is therefore
not subject to Exchange Act liability for the filing of false or misleading documents with
the SEC. HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
28 (2002).
161. International Accounting Standards, Securities Act Release No. 33-7801, 71
SEC Docket (CCH) at 1551 (Feb. 16, 2000). In 2000, the IASC was restructured as the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
See International Accounting
Standards Board, Restructuring IASC (1997-1999), at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/
0001.asp?s=1093928&sc={C4B840A7-C000-4252-8AC6-579E55482F7F}&n=91
(last
visited Jan. 18, 2003).
162. The fate of the proposal is unclear. Some analysts believe U.S. issuers will
oppose, since the move allows their foreign competitors the benefit of lower standards.
However, a similar push by the NYSE to relieve foreign issuers of the burdens of U.S.
GAAP reconciliation has generated no discernible opposition from large U.S. issuers. See
infra note 233 and accompanying text. Other opposition may also surface from those
opposed to lower accounting standards generally. The fear is that U.S. issuers may push
to use the same lower standards. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at
398 n.30.
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market, local issuers are more or less territorially bound. Regulators are
therefore free to some extent to ignore the desires of their “captive”
consumers. There are limits to the degree of discrimination, of course.
As discrimination increases to the disadvantage of domestic issuers, the
costs of political action to remedy the discrimination become relatively
more palatable, an issue I discuss below.163
C. Issuer Choice?
The preceding discussion suggests that in the strongest securities
markets, national regulators bent on bureaucratic aggrandizement will
pursue a strategy of regulatory price discrimination. Playing issuer
choice, however, would make no sense, at least if we credit the
assumptions of issuer choice proponents concerning regulators’
incentives. On this view, regulators’ desire for bureaucratic
aggrandizement will cause them to overregulate—i.e., impose regulation
exceeding the regulatory ideal for each firm.164 Therefore, a move from
the current mandatory territorial system to issuer choice would likely
result in a number of issuers figuratively “fleeing” from U.S. regulation to
lower cost regulatory regimes. Issuer choice would allow issuers to
escape the overzealous regulation of the SEC while continuing to issue
and list their securities in the United States, effectively breaking the
SEC’s regulatory monopoly.165
Assuming regulators’ incentives are as issuer choice proponents say,
we have to conclude that regulators in price-setting jurisdictions would
oppose competition and rules creating a competitive framework. More
likely, the rational regulator will strive to preserve her monopoly and
pursue a price discrimination strategy.166 Under the current territorial
163. See infra Part III.B.3.
164. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
165. Jack Coffee has questioned this assumption of issuer choice proponents that
regulators necessarily overregulate. Instead, Coffee identifies a trend suggesting that
strong regulation may attract issuers, rather than repel them. He argues that foreign firms
cross-list in the U.S. in order to bond themselves to high disclosure standards that protect
minority shareholder interests. Listing in the U.S. serves as a commitment device that
attracts investors and improves firm values. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the
Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International
Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002).
166. Some scholars have argued that even if the leaders of the bureaucracy
espouse these self-aggrandizing goals, lower level employees will have no stake in
achieving these ends, and agency and transaction costs within the bureaucracy will
preclude their attainment. This organizational behavior literature predicts lethargy and
unresponsiveness to either public or private interests. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort,
The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of
Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (1990).

1402

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

system, price-setting national regulators need only compete for marginal
foreign issuers, for whom the regulatory “full price” may be too high. At
the same time, regulators may maintain their monopolies over captive
domestic issuers. The SEC’s current program to ease disclosure and other
requirements for foreign issuers is consistent with this strategy.
D. Price-Taking Jurisdictions
Price-taking jurisdictions face a different set of constraints and
opportunities from price setters. However, regulators in price-taking
jurisdictions are no more likely to pursue issuer choice than in pricesetting jurisdictions.
Price-taking jurisdictions will be those with relatively smaller, less
liquid, less attractive capital markets. For foreign and perhaps even local
issuers, the small local capital market has many possible substitutes, so
issuers will be price sensitive. Such jurisdictions face high demand
elasticity and are susceptible to price competition from other jurisdictions.
Even local companies may have no strong incentive to issue securities
locally if the regulatory regime is inhospitable. Therefore, price takers
must take care to assure they do not lose “business” by regulatory
mispricing of access to their capital markets. Regulators will have a more
difficult time pursuing both goals of augmenting their securities
bureaucracies and also maximizing the volume of local securities
offerings and trading. Unlike their counterparts in the largest national
markets, regulators in price-taking jurisdictions will feel strong pressure
to lower their regulatory prices in order to maximize the volume of local
securities activity to preserve the local industry.
Regulators may therefore have little leverage to negotiate reciprocal
recognition arrangements with other states. They may have no choice but
to lower regulatory hurdles unilaterally or to offer unilateral recognition
of foreign regulatory regimes. This strategy forswears application of
national regulation to firms issuing or listing in the national market, but it
at least facilitates securities activity within the jurisdiction to preserve the
On the other hand, if survival of the bureaucracy is at stake, it is far more likely that
all participants in the bureaucracy would band together for the common goal of preserving
the organization. The goals of the head bureaucrats would faithfully be pursued by the
rank-and-file. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest
Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 917-18
(1994). Asking the SEC to give up its territorial regulatory jurisdiction—as issuer choice
does—might be perceived as a life-and-death struggle.
In any event, proponents of issuer choice assume that governments will be
responsive to external stimuli, an assumption I am content to indulge. This indulgence,
however, hardly points to the emergence of a framework conducive to the regulatory
competition envisioned by issuer choice advocates.
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viability of the national market itself.167 And if the regulatory agency is
reluctant to give up its regulatory jurisdiction, pressure from the securities
industry may cause national lawgivers to act instead.
Israel’s recent history provides one salient example. Until recently,
many Israeli high-tech firms listed their shares on the NYSE without also
listing with the Tel Aviv exchange. U.S. disclosure requirements for
foreign issuers are different from, and in some areas less stringent than,
Israeli disclosure rules.168 These Israeli firms avoided the costs of
complying with Israeli securities law simply by not listing in Israel. As
part of an effort to win back listings, the Knesset, Israel’s legislature,
recently changed its law to provide for unilateral recognition of U.S.
securities laws, effectively exempting Israeli firms already in compliance
with U.S. disclosure rules. The Israeli Securities Agency (ISA) had not
provided such an exemption. It fought the legislative change along
various dimensions, but was ultimately unsuccessful. The Knesset chose
to favor the local securities industry over the ISA’s pleas for more
stringent regulation.169
That regulators in price-taking jurisdictions lack market power,
however, does not imply that they would prefer issuer choice. By
definition, price takers are forced by market pressures to take the
regulatory price set by price-setting jurisdictions. They may have to
accord recognition to the regulatory regimes of particular jurisdictions.
But this does not suggest that price takers need offer blanket recognition
to whatever securities regime an issuer might choose. Moreover, the
interaction of price takers with price setters suggests that even wholesale
recognition by price takers would not create the competitive regime
envisioned by issuer choice proponents. Regulators in price-setting
jurisdictions will not feel the market pressure that affects price takers.
The market power of the one and the lack of market power of the other
guaranty that recognition will only go in one direction. Israel may be
forced to accord recognition to U.S. law, but the United States feels no
similar pressure to allow local securities activities of issuers regulated
solely under Israeli law.
167. See Amir N. Licht, Stock Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and
the Privatization of Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 583, 596-98 (2001)
(describing unilateral recognition strategy of small to medium-sized stock exchanges in
smaller capital markets); Cally Jordan, Regulation of Canadian Capital Markets in the
1990s: The United States in the Driver’s Seat, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 577, 596 (1995)
(describing Canada’s proposed strategy of regulatory “free-riding”).
168. See Amir N. Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign Listing: Some
Direct Evidence, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 325, 338 (2001).
169. See id. at 340-41. Roberta Romano also recognizes regulators’ disincentives
to promote competition, especially regulators from smaller markets. See Romano, Need
for Competition, supra note 10, at 390-400.

1404

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

III. INTEREST GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Regulators are of course not the only actors affecting the
development of international securities regulation. Legislative and
executive action would likely be required to bring about the international
cooperation necessary for an international issuer choice system. More
generally, legislators and executives exercise oversight over the structure
of national securities regulation and the interface among national
regulatory regimes. Unlike securities regulators, however, legislators and
executives are unlikely to hold strong personal preferences regarding the
structure of international securities regulation. They lack the personal
stake that regulators have.170 Its technical nature and its low visibility and
salience for the general public ordinarily make securities regulation a
difficult area around which to rally popular opinion.171 Instead, we can
expect any reforms to turn on a struggle among the various interests of the
informed and concentrated few.172 In the United States, besides the
obvious influence of the SEC, securities lawyers, other industry
professionals, and corporate interests are likely to weigh in on any
proposal to effect a major shift in the choice of law rules for U.S.
securities law.
The importance of interest groups in domestic politics has been
recognized for some time.173 However, in international politics,
influential scholars have long been content to treat states as black boxes

170. Rational legislators may delegate to agencies to avoid blame for the costs of
regulation, while also being able to claim credit for its benefits. See MORRIS P. FIORINA,
CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 39-49 (1977); Morris P.
Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative
Power, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33 (1986).
171. Moreover, as recent events have suggested, a spectacular securities fraud
case might galvanize public opinion in favor of more stringent regulation. See, e.g., Enron
Fallout: Public Policy Consequences of Enron’s Collapse, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 9 (Mar. 4, 2002) (discussing likely regulatory reforms in securities, accounting and
auditing, corporate governance, and pension areas, among others, following the demise of
Enron). It is more difficult to imagine a similar spellbinding example of costly
overregulation that spurs public outrage and ensuing securities deregulation.
172. See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
173. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FORMULATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); OLSON,
supra note 172.
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or “billiard ball[s],”174 viewing states as rational unitary actors with stable
and broadly similar domestic preferences. Under this approach, domestic
politics matters little if at all. “[T]he internal attributes of [states] are
given by assumption rather than treated as variables.”175
The methodological individualism of rational choice theory,
however, has found its way into international political discourse.
Nuanced models of state behavior look through the state to the underlying
interests of individuals and interest groups that influence international
affairs.176 Scholars of political economy use “two-level” games to model
this relation between domestic influences and international relations.177
Domestic politics matters for international policy, and unitary actor
models of state behavior run the risk of missing important domestic
causal variables that affect international policy.178
174. Andrew Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic
Theories of International Bargaining, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 5 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993).
175. Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and
Beyond, in NEO-REALISM AND ITS CRITICS 165 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986).
176. The longstanding realist tradition of treating states as unitary actors may be
justifiable in national security contexts. If national survival is truly at stake, then one
might plausibly assume all groups within the nation could unite to pursue the singular goal
of survival. However, this simplifying assumption becomes less useful when commercial
and economic relations are at issue, since domestic factionalism is likely to matter a great
deal. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 29 (1984).
177. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TwoLevel Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988); see also DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY:
INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS, supra note 174; HELEN V. MILNER,
INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (1997); Jonathan R. Macey, Chicken Wars as a Prisoners’ Dilemma: What’s
in a Game?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448 (1989) (reviewing JOHN A.C. CONYBEARE,
TRADE WARS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL RIVALRY
(1987)) (noting importance of public choice analysis in understanding trade policy
formation).
178. See Keisuke Iida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?: TwoLevel Games with Uncertainty, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 403, 403-04 (1993) (criticizing the
realist tradition of "treat[ing] nation-states as unitary actors,” and noting that “[i]n reality,
foreign policy decisions are the result of political processes within nation-states”);
Moravcsik, supra note 174, at 4; Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoners’
Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 923, 925-26 (1985) (acknowledging drawbacks to realist assumption “[t]reating
states as goal-seeking actors with well-defined preferences”). Moreover, speaking of
states’ interests and states’ preferences may be anthropomorphic: “Institutions in general,
and governments in particular, do not have preferences, people do. Governmental policy
reflects the preferences of powerful constituents, not some mystically determined set of
preferences that might be described as the ‘national interest.’” Colombatto & Macey,
supra note 59, at 931-32; see also Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to
Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1169 (2000) (criticizing traditional
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Domestic politics matters because the state is not a unitary
actor. Groups within it have different policy preferences
because they are differentially affected by government policies.
Any change in policies, as might occur because of international
cooperation, has domestic distributional and electoral
consequences. These domestic consequences are the “stuff” of
politics.179
In this Part, I consider interest groups and the international
cooperation that would be necessary to implement issuer choice. My
discussion focuses primarily on the U.S. context and price-setting
jurisdictions. I first discuss likely interest group alignments that would
frustrate achievement of international issuer choice agreements.180
The discussion in the preceding Part suggests that regulators will be
an important interest group in their own right. Given their assumed
incentives of bureaucratic aggrandizement, they will prefer regulatory
price discrimination to issuer choice. Moreover, several features of the
existing structure of domestic and international securities regulation
suggest that securities regulators will dominate any endeavors toward
international regulatory coordination. Regulators have significant
informational and other advantages over legislators and executives who
would attempt to oversee their regulatory activities. In addition, I show
below the likely absence of any domestic interest group unambiguously
committed to issuer choice. This further reduces its likelihood.
Identification of regulatory price discrimination as a plausible
strategy for regulators in price-setting jurisdictions is important to the
ensuing interest group analysis because it more realistically describes the
political and policy alternatives for the various interested groups than
have previous commentators. To the extent issuer choice advocates have
discussed the politics of issuer choice, they have tended to pose the policy
emphasis on government interests, as opposed to individual interests, in U.S. conflicts
scholarship and court opinions).
179. MILNER, supra note 177, at 16.
180. One must necessarily speak in terms of probabilities as opposed to proofs in
attempting to forecast interest group alignments, especially in the international context.
As Andrew Guzman has noted:
The difficulty in applying public choice to normative analyses . . . is that the
outcome of interest group politics is very difficult to predict. It is, therefore,
difficult to construct a model of government decisionmaking—even if one
focuses on relatively well-defined areas of law such as antitrust or securities.
Once one adds an international dimension to the problem, the task is even
more difficult.
Guzman, supra note 33, at 902 (citation omitted).
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alternatives in stark contrast. Private choice reform is contrasted to the
status quo of mandatory disclosure, which is characterized as a monolithic
endeavor by regulatory monopolists to force rules upon recalcitrant
issuers. Identification of the price discrimination strategy suggests that
regulators may be more responsive to market pressure and to pressure
from interested groups than the standard regulatory monopolist
description implies.181 This responsiveness tends to undermine not only
claims concerning the inefficiency of the status quo, but also issuer choice
advocates’ implicit assertion that interested groups exist that would prefer
issuer choice.
A lack of interest group support is not the only obstacle to issuer
choice cooperation. As with securities regulation generally, international
agreements concerning regulatory jurisdiction would necessarily be
technical, complex affairs. Detailing, monitoring, and enforcing
commitments would be difficult, and this difficulty would likely
discourage commitment ex ante. This is especially damaging for the
prospects for issuer choice. Regulatory price discrimination is the status
quo. Without useful international agreements, no reform—whether issuer
choice or some other approach—can emerge.
I first explain regulators’ unique role as the dominant interest group
in any international undertaking for regulatory coordination. I then
discuss other interest groups, their various stakes in promoting or
opposing issuer choice versus regulatory price discrimination, and their
likely influence on national policymakers. Finally, I note the demands of
international coalition formation and the effects of complexity and
ambiguity in achieving international cooperation. Along with the two
possible approaches of issuer choice and regulatory price discrimination, I
also consider harmonization. I ultimately conclude that of these three,
issuer choice is the least likely to arise.
A. Regulators’ Dominant Role in International Securities Regulation
Given the highly detailed and technical nature of securities
regulation, regulators will have significant informational advantages over
legislators and executives, who ordinarily have little incentive to devote
resources to monitoring regulators or educating themselves about
regulators’ activities.182 In the even narrower area of international
181. John Coates makes a similar point regarding SEC responsiveness to issuers.
See Coates, supra note 137, at 553.
182. “Although the nominal relation of a bureau and its sponsor is that of a
bilateral monopoly, the relative incentives and available information, under most
conditions, give the bureau the overwhelmingly dominant monopoly power.” NISKANEN,
supra note 82, at 30.
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securities regulation, which requires some knowledge of regulatory
practices in foreign jurisdictions, regulators’ informational advantage is
overwhelming. Without some way of ameliorating this information
deficit, legislators and executives will be in a poor position to initiate any
change that regulators oppose. Regulators’ opposition may therefore be
fatal for issuer choice.183
Informed interest groups may assist policy makers in overcoming
information deficits.184 However, as I describe below, it is unlikely—at
least in regulatory price-setting jurisdictions—that any interest group will
emerge that unambiguously supports issuer choice. Without an interest
group champion with sufficient interest and resources to counter
regulators’ informational superiority, the prospects for issuer choice are
bleak.185
Absent support of important interest groups, national lawmakers will
likely be reluctant to back issuer choice over regulators’ opposition.
Politicians are risk averse, and a move to issuer choice presents
uncertainty. Politicians will be reluctant to assume publicly the
responsibility for the uncertain outcomes resulting from the broad
deregulation of securities markets that issuer choice would entail.186 Even
assuming the improved capital market efficiency that issuer choice
proponents claim would result, that outcome is not sexy. Certain
interested groups might understand and appreciate this result in the
abstract, but it is difficult to measure or demonstrate in the short run, and
might not be salient to the general public.187 The downside political risk
183. See ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION:
THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE 188 (1992) (describing virtual veto power of SEC as to
legislation it opposes).
184. See MILNER, supra note 177, at 23 (“[T]he ‘solution’ to the information
problem of legislatures is to depend on informed interest groups.”).
185. See id. at 22 (asserting necessity of at least one interest group to endorse
policy as to which legislature suffers information deficit).
186. See KHADEMIAN, supra note 183, at 12 (describing risk aversion of
legislators with respect to securities policy).
187. This is not to say that deregulation may never result from widespread public
indignation and in the face of interest group opposition. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer
L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a
Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 168 (1990) (discussing importance of “public
agenda” in reducing political slack, which otherwise enables regulators to favor private
interests). Deregulation has occurred in securities and other industries, but is typically a
result of changing economic conditions and shifting interest group alignments. One
famous instance of securities deregulation was the abolition of the NYSE’s fixed
commission structure with the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29,
89 Stat. 97, 107 (1975). However, this deregulatory moment is not inconsistent with
interest group theories of regulation. Though the NYSE was a powerful opponent of
deregulation of fixed commission rates, the rise of institutional investors created a
powerful counterweight to NYSE influence. Moreover, institutional investors’ increasing
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seems greater. A loss of investor confidence, perhaps followed by a
market downturn, would not only hurt private interests. It would also put
securities deregulation on the “public agenda,”188 drawing negative
attention from the general public and damaging the political fortunes of
any sponsoring lawmakers.
Incremental moves in the direction of private choice—as opposed to
wholesale adoption overnight—could of course reduce the scope of
legislative uncertainty. For instance, the United States could first agree
with Canada that both countries’ issuers could avail themselves of either
country’s securities regime.189 And then either or both could reach a
similar agreement with the United Kingdom.190 But even this incremental
approach may be fraught with uncertainty. Even with the limited
recognition of disclosure systems between the United States and Canada
under MJDS,191 dissatisfaction with Canadian enforcement recently
ability to avoid fixed commissions by trading on regional exchanges and over the counter
also put competitive pressure on fixed commissions, making their abolition less drastic a
change than it might otherwise appear. See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER,
THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, at ch. 4 (1981). Ideologically driven deregulation
may occur in the face of opposition from concentrated groups. However, this
phenomenon apparently occurs primarily where expert consensus strongly—perhaps
uniformly—supports deregulation, which is not the case here. See MARTHA DERTHICK &
PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985) (discussing pro-competitive
deregulation in the airline, trucking, and telecommunications industries in the 1970s and
early 1980s, which occurred despite powerful industry support for regulatory protection).
188. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 187, at 191-92.
Those not specially affected by regulatory information do not ordinarily invest
in acquiring it.
However, at any given time in any given polity, there is a small set of
issues that has become the object of intense public attention. These issues are
very widely attended to. They are covered in virtually every issue of every
printed news medium, and are reported on constantly by the broadcast media.
These issues pervade the information atmosphere. . . . Let us call the set of
these issues the “public agenda.”
Id.
189. Canada and the United States have implemented MJDS, a system of mutual
recognition for their respective disclosure rules. See supra note 79 and accompanying
text. While MJDS allows qualifying companies of both countries to rely on their home
country disclosures to issue securities in the other jurisdiction, it does not affect issuer
choice. It does not permit a U.S issuer to select application of Canadian disclosure rules
or vice versa.
190. A shared language and business culture with the United States make Canada
and the United Kingdom the most promising candidates for a nascent issuer choice
arrangement with the United States. Cf. Scott, supra note 52, at 84 (“The United
Kingdom would be a logical candidate for the MJDS extension, given its shared AngloSaxon tradition and English language with the United States and Canada.”). Apparently,
at some point, the United Kingdom was considered a prime candidate for expansion of
MJDS. See id. at 85.
191. See supra note 75 and accompanying text and notes 189-90.
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caused the SEC to consider eliminating the program.192 While the Ontario
Securities Commission’s responsiveness to the SEC’s concerns seems to
have preserved the program for the time being,193 the experience
illustrates the difficulty of predicting ex ante how cross-border
recognition of securities law may play out.194 In addition, it further
emphasizes the critical role of regulators in monitoring and managing
cross-border cooperative arrangements on securities regulation.
Another factor that will tend to inhibit politicians from embracing
issuer choice absent interest group support is their short time horizons.195
Even if issuer choice were ultimately to produce net benefits to society,
the timing of the realization of the potential costs and benefits would
dissuade politicians from backing it. Issuer choice advocates
acknowledge the probable switching costs involved with its
implementation.196 An initial period of confusion would ensue, as issuers,
investors, and regulators sorted out the myriad details of integrating
foreign securities rules for local securities transactions. It seems likely
that over time, a handful of regimes would predominate in any given
national market, such that the menu of probable choices would become
manageable and scale economies could be realized.197 In the meantime,
though, a real possibility would exist of a market hiccup or dramatic
scandal that could be linked to issuer choice deregulation.
The problem for politicians is that switching costs are borne largely
in the short run, while the claimed benefits of issuer choice would accrue,
if at all, in the long run. As earlier noted, the general public would be
unable to appraise immediately the claimed long-run efficiency
advantages, which would emerge only over time.198 But electoral politics
192. See Scott, supra note 52, at 82 (describing SEC dissatisfaction).
193. See Eric Reguly, To the Point: OSC Deserves Credit for Saving Threatened
Access to U.S., GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 18, 2001, at B10 (describing Ontario Securities
Commission improvements in disclosure enforcement responding to SEC pressure).
194. For further discussion of indeterminacy in international securities regulatory
cooperation, see infra Part II.C.2.
195. See Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of
Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 261 (2000).
196. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 924-27 (discussing possibility of
information overload from issuer choice and possible remedial measures).
197. See id.
198. In the short run under issuer choice, in the best case, issuers in the United
States might choose more lax regulation because U.S. law is too burdensome. But that
would merely highlight for the public the weaknesses of the U.S. regulatory regime. This
might prove satisfying for issuer choice advocates, but it is not clear that any legislators
would end up looking good. Why were the securities laws so burdensome in the first
place? In the worst case, if issuers chose more lax regulation to commit fraud or behave
opportunistically toward security holders, U.S. investors would suffer, and legislators
would surely look bad. I am indebted to Jill Fisch, Professor of Law, Fordham University
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forces elected officials to discount the future severely. A politician who
must stand for re-election every few years will prefer policies with
discernible short-term payoffs, with less regard for long-term effects that
occur in the next election cycle. Any long-term benefits will generally
accrue to the political benefit of some other politician.199
In the end, issuer choice is not a reform to which legislators will
naturally be attracted without interest group support. The potential
benefits are politically murky and not easily realized in the short term; the
possible costs are politically salient—hardly an appealing policy
prescription for risk averse politicians. In addition, regulators will enjoy
significant information advantages over elected officials with respect to
international securities regulatory policy. Regulators’ opposition to issuer
choice, then, will be a significant impediment to its adoption.
B. Interest Groups
As noted above, interest group involvement could theoretically
overcome politicians’ reluctance and information deficit with respect to
issuer choice.200 How would various interest groups line up as between a
price discrimination approach—a plausible characterization of the status
quo—and issuer choice reform? It would appear that several important
groups would oppose issuer choice but none would unambiguously
support it. Those with significant investments in the status quo—either
human capital investments or investments in institutional structures—
would support regulatory price discrimination and oppose a move to
private choice. In particular, regulators and those paid to advise issuers
concerning regulation—primarily securities lawyers and accountants—
could be expected to oppose vigorously any move toward international
issuer choice. Securities firms and exchanges might theoretically be
attracted to the increased volume of securities activity that issuer choice
promises. However, these groups also have large stakes in the current
U.S. regulatory structure, including built-in informational advantages over
other market participants. Moreover, regulatory price discrimination can
increase securities volume as well, without the disruption that would
attend a switch to private choice.

School of Law and Director, Fordham Center for Corporate, Securities, and Financial
Law, for this observation.
199. Interest groups with long-term stakes in an issue might be able to persuade
politicians to adopt longer time horizons. However, it is unclear whether any such interest
group exists with respect to issuer choice. See infra Part III.B.
200. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
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The group left out of this rent fest, of course, is domestic issuers.
They are more or less tied to the U.S. market.201 Lower regulatory
standards for foreign issuers can only harm domestic issuers by lowering
foreign rivals’ costs of capital, placing domestic issuers at a competitive
disadvantage. However, opposition to regulatory price discrimination
would not likely drive issuers to support private choice. Harmonization
may be issuers’ favored approach.
I elaborate on these analyses below.
1. LAWYERS AND ACCOUNTANTS
As already noted, maximizing regulators would not want to have to
compete for a market that they have already captured. Lawyers and
accountants will share similar incentives with regulators. With their
expertise in national securities law, lawyers have significant
undiversifiable human capital investments that are more or less
territorially bound. Accountants will possess similar territorially-bound
expertise concerning U.S. GAAP and financial disclosure requirements
under U.S. securities law. In that sense, these groups benefit from the
national regulatory monopoly as much as regulators do. They should
therefore support the existing territorial system, as well as regulators’
attempts to expand the reach of national law by attracting foreign issuers
through price discrimination.
U.S. lawyers’ stock in trade, for example, is their ability to advise
with respect to U.S. law. U.S. lawyers are expert in crafting disclosure
documents for their client firms subject to the securities laws. Corporate
and plaintiffs’-side securities lawyers are expert at litigating class actions
under the complex liability and procedural rules peculiar to the U.S.
regime of private enforcement. For their part, U.S. accountants have
developed expertise in producing and auditing the complex and detailed
financial statements required of issuers under U.S. securities laws,202 as
well as expertise in avoiding the possible securities fraud liability that
may follow an accounting misstep.203

201. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. While domestic issuers might be
able to issue new securities in overseas markets, their existing listings in the United States
subject them to the U.S. disclosure apparatus. Delisting locally is unlikely to be a useful
alternative, at least in the near term.
202. Regulation S-X describes the accounting rules applicable to SEC filings and
the audited financial statements required under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to .12-29.
203. See HAZEN, supra note 34, § 9.6 (describing SEC auditing and accounting
requirements).
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Under an issuer choice regime, there is a high probability that
demand for all this expertise would decline. Most analysts agree that U.S.
disclosure requirements are among the most stringent in the world. If as
commonly assumed among issuer choice advocates, this level of
disclosure is suboptimal for some nontrivial percentage of firms, then the
demand for U.S. securities lawyers’ and accountants’ expertise would
likely decline. Issuers may choose to issue in the United States, but under
the less stringent disclosure obligations of other nations. In that case, the
volume of securities sold and traded within the United States would
probably rise, while the number of issuers subject to U.S. disclosure rules
would not, and may in fact decline. The armies of private lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals who produce corporate disclosure
documents would see no benefit in the increased volume of securities
activity in the United States.204
More generally, lawyers’ and accountants’ livelihood would depend
to a great extent on the outcome of the competition for law. If one’s
home country law turned out not to be popular among issuers, the demand
for legal and accounting expertise would decline, and their professional
and financial fortunes would suffer. Among those invested in the current
regime of U.S. securities regulation, besides the SEC, private securities
lawyers and accountants have perhaps the largest stake in maintaining the
status quo—including further steps in the direction of price
discrimination—and opposing issuer choice.
A few qualifications to the above analysis may be in order.
Individual lawyers and accountants could possibly attempt to remedy the
territorial limits of their expertise by diversifying their human capital and
developing expertise in the securities laws and accounting rules of other
jurisdictions besides their home countries. However, given differences in
language, culture, and business practices, as well as the complexity and
nuance of both securities law and accounting rules, it would likely be
quite difficult for many lawyers or accountants to develop sufficient
expertise in a foreign securities regulatory regime to be able to compete
for business with professionals indigenous to the jurisdiction. Lawyers
might in addition have to navigate whatever market-restricting
professional certification requirements might apply to the practice of law
in any particular foreign jurisdiction. Rather than take up these burdens,
lawyers and accountants in price-setting jurisdictions are more likely to
support the status quo and oppose issuer choice.
Lawyers and accountants might instead diversify their human capital
internationally by forming partnerships to pool different types of legal
204. For a discussion of the costs of employing these armies of corporate
disclosure professionals, see PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 187, at 44.
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expertise. Just as a diversified investment portfolio enables investors to
eliminate the effects of unsystematic risk, diverse human capital assets
within a well-diversified law firm or accounting firm enable the firm, as a
whole, to profit despite downturns in particular practice areas at particular
times. Profits may be generated by different partners at different times.
Over the long run, the peeks and troughs of any given partner’s practice
activity and profit production are smoothed out via the profit-sharing
arrangements of the firm.
Firms can diversify not only across practice areas, of course, but also
across countries, so that as economic conditions and revenues change
within countries, or as legal or accounting work migrates across borders,
an internationally diversified firm is able to smooth out country-based
peeks and troughs just as it does for practice areas. At least theoretically,
an internationally diversified firm would be indifferent as to which
jurisdiction’s securities laws applied to particular transactions, since it
would have expertise in the law of all important jurisdictions. It would be
indifferent as between issuer choice and regulatory price discrimination,
except to the extent either would generate more securities work on a
global basis.
This possibility of international diversification, however, may not
significantly alter the territorial quality of individual lawyers’ and
accountants’ expertise and economic interests. Even in international
alliances, firms typically dole out profits based roughly on who is
responsible for their creation. That is, each partner eats what she kills.
While all members may share in the firm’s overall good fortune, they do
not typically share equally. The partners responsible for more profits—
however “responsible” is defined within each firm—are usually more
equal than others.205 In terms of issuer choice proposals, this means that
despite being a member of a diversified international firm, a U.S.
securities lawyer or accountant will still prefer to maximize the amount of
securities work that applies U.S. rules. She would rather do the work and
generate the profits than have her partner in another jurisdiction do it.
Finally, depending on how enforcement is structured under an issuer
choice regime, securities litigators might possibly see an increased
demand for their services. Proponents of issuer choice understandably
have not reached consensus as to the appropriate choice of forum for
enforcement of the substantive rules chosen by any issuer.206 If the
205. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (Penguin Books 1996) (1946) (“All
animals are equal. But some animals are more equal than others.”). See generally David
B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law
Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 535-36 (1996) (discussing
competitive nature of law partnerships).
206. See infra notes 239-42.
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issuer’s home country were to become the standard venue for
enforcement under an issuer choice regime, then it is at least conceivable
that U.S. securities litigators could have as much or more work under
issuer choice. Suppose issuer choice proponents are correct that free
choice would unleash a torrent of heretofore suppressed demand for
capital by issuers and demand for securities by investors.207 Under this
view, issuer choice remedies a regulatory mispricing and eliminates
deadweight losses from this mispricing. If the issuer’s home country is
where private litigation is to be brought, and if U.S. issuers issue more
securities worldwide under issuer choice than under the current
mandatory U.S. regime, then it is at least conceivable that U.S. securities
litigators might end up with more work. Even if U.S. lawyers needed to
rely on foreign experts regarding the substantive law of the firm-selected
regime, presumably they would still retain a competitive edge in litigating
cases in U.S. courts and would be the principal lawyers in those cases.
This scenario further assumes, of course, that U.S. issuers would select
regimes with nontrivial regulation and that effective private remedies
would survive in an issuer choice system. In addition, international
arbitration may emerge as a popular method of resolving international
securities disputes under an issuer choice regime.208 If so, U.S. lawyers
may be particularly well-suited to compete for retentions.
On the other hand, these various possible benefits to U.S. lawyers
under issuer choice are quite speculative. Lawyers being risk averse in
terms of their financial interests, we can expect that in general, they
would prefer the bird in the hand—steady augmentation of their fortunes
through regulatory price discrimination—to the indeterminate number of
birds they might enjoy under issuer choice.
Lawyers and accountants are likely to constitute well-organized and
well-financed interest groups. Their undiversified human capital and high
per capita economic stakes in continued and expanding application of
U.S. securities law suggests that they would offer strong opposition to
issuer choice.209

207. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 916-17; Romano, Empowering
Investors, supra note 10, at 2362-64.
208. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 409.
209. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 498-509 (1987) (describing
self-interested role of Delaware corporate bar in influencing course of Delaware corporate
law).
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2.

EXCHANGES AND SECURITIES FIRMS

In contrast to securities lawyers, the fortunes of exchanges and
securities firms are tied to the volume of securities offered and traded in
the national markets in which they operate, without any necessary
connection to applicable law.210 To the extent that territorial regulations
deter securities activity within a given jurisdiction, exchanges and
securities firms would favor reducing those regulatory hurdles.211
According to issuer choice proponents, offering issuers a choice of
regulatory regimes less stringent and costly than the U.S. regime would
almost certainly increase securities activity in the United States in the
long run. Moreover, in a world of private choice, according to issuer
choice advocates, this desire of securities industry interests to maximize
the local volume of securities activity acts as a positive influence on
national regulators. Regulators’ desire to benefit their important
constituents in the industry would spur them to propose regulation that
issuers want, since issuers would likely issue securities in the jurisdiction
whose regulation they select.212
That securities industry interests are promoted through deregulatory
reforms that increase local volume, however, does not necessarily mean
the industry would favor issuer choice. All sorts of regulatory changes
could spur an increase in local volume. Regulatory price discrimination,
for instance, does just that. Perhaps recognizing this, the NYSE actively
lobbied the SEC to lower certain regulatory requirements for foreign
issuers in the United States,213 efforts that were rewarded with some of the
special rules for foreign issuers that exemplify the SEC’s regulatory price
discrimination strategy.214 The NYSE continues to lobby for relaxed
accounting reconciliation requirements for certain categories of foreign
issuers. James Cochrane, senior vice president and chief economist for
the NYSE, has stated that exempting world-class foreign issuers from
U.S. GAAP reconciliation is the NYSE's “number one priority.”215 In
210. As with law firms, exchanges and securities firms may diversify across
borders. See Licht, supra note 167, at 592 (discussing recent stock exchange mergers and
alliances). With exchanges, because international alliances are a recent development, it is
difficult to tell the extent to which exchanges may lose their national character.
211. See JAMES A. FANTO & ROBERTA S. KARMEL, A REPORT ON THE ATTITUDES
OF FOREIGN COMPANIES REGARDING A U.S. LISTING 5 (NYSE Working Paper No. 97-101,
1997); Choi & Guzman, supra note 87, at 1874; Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at
770.
212. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
213. Licht, supra note 167, at 597.
214. See supra notes 148-63 and accompanying text.
215. See James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign
Firms Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S58, S61 (1994).
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addition, while NYSE rules contain certain corporate governance
requirements for listed companies, foreign issuers may readily obtain
exemptions from these rules.216 Similar exemptions are available under
the listing rules of the American Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ. The
SEC, recognizing the competitive interests of the exchanges in
encouraging foreign listings,217 acquiesced in this approach.218
Critics of the SEC are also quick to point out the well-organized
securities industry interests that benefit from the SEC’s mandatory
disclosure system and other policies. Lawyers and accountants get paid to
produce disclosure documents, and securities analysts, portfolio
managers, and other securities professionals get the benefit of this
publicly disclosed information for free, information they find quite useful
but would otherwise have to pay for.219 Industry professionals may also
be the ultimate beneficiaries of SEC rules against insider trading, since
those rules eliminate from the market the only potential traders with better
information than industry professionals.220

216. See NYSE, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §
103.00 (1999).
217. The relaxation of requirements applicable to foreign issuers was . . . an
SEC response to the needs of the U.S. stock exchanges and their investment
banking members to develop a U.S. market for foreign securities. Specifically,
they argued that differences between the corporate governance practices of
foreign issuers and the corporate governance requirements of the U.S.
exchanges would unduly inhibit those companies from listing on U.S.
exchanges. Accordingly, the SEC was convinced that the special treatment of
foreign issuers was warranted.
Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS.
LAW. 1487, 1514-15 (2002).
218. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by
the American Stock Exchange, Inc. and New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Amend the
Exchanges’ Listing Standards for Foreign Companies, Exchange Act Rel. No. 24,634, 52
Fed. Reg. 24,230 (June 29, 1987).
219. See PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 187, at 22-23. One report found
securities analysts to be the group most reliant on mandatory filings, as 77.8% of sell-side
and 91.3% of buy-side analysts reported the Form 10-K was vital to them. See id. at 37
(citing U.S. Congress, House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 95th Cong., Comm. Print 95-29 (Nov. 3, 1977), at 62).
220. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A
Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 311 (1987). It is unclear to what extent the recently promulgated Regulation FD
will affect the benefits to industry of insider trading prohibitions. “FD” stands “fair
disclosure,” and among other things, Regulation FD prohibits issuers from making
selective disclosure of material nonpublic information See Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, Release No. 33-7881, Release No. 34-43154, 73 SEC Docket (CCH), at 3
(Aug. 15, 2000).
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Given their stakes in the status quo, and the fact that the SEC’s
current regulatory price discrimination strategy will increase the volume
of local securities activity, industry interests in the United States would
likely be reluctant to reject the benefits they currently enjoy in favor of
issuer choice, a reform with uncertain impact on their rents. Private
institutional arrangements have grown up around the SEC’s mandatory
disclosure system. As with lawyers and accountants, securities
professionals—investment bankers, brokers, analysts, and others—have
human and institutional capital invested in existing practices. These
practices likely generate increasing returns in the current environment,
while switching to issuer choice may impose high start-up costs before
comparable benefits were realized, if ever.
Institutions and policies may encourage individuals and
organizations to invest in specialized skills, deepen relationships
with other individuals and organizations, and develop particular
political and social identities. These activities increase the
attractiveness of existing institutional arrangements relative to
hypothetical alternatives. As social actors make commitments
based on existing institutions and policies, their cost of exit
from established arrangements generally rises dramatically.221
Law reform that would drastically diminish the value of existing
arrangements or render them obsolete will not likely garner the support of
exchanges or securities firms.222
As between regulatory price
discrimination and issuer choice, exchanges and securities firms in the
United States will likely prefer the former.
3. ISSUERS AND INVESTORS
In something of an apparent irony, it appears that “corporate
America”—issuers and institutional investors, who are supposed direct
beneficiaries of issuer choice—implicitly reject it. John Coates notes that
corporate America has instead supported harmonized regulation, both
nationally and internationally, a course in exactly the opposite direction
221. Pierson, supra note 195, at 259.
222. The prospects for substantial cost-reducing modification in our
corporate disclosure system are . . . slim when viewed from the perspective of
the economics of regulation. Two relatively small, well-organized groups
have strong and understandable interests in seeing that the SEC corporate
system is preserved and expanded, namely, professionals who produce the
disclosure documents and who receive them free.
PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 187, at 51.

2002:1363

From Monopolists to Markets?

1419

from issuer choice.223 On the national level, Coates points out, businesses
supported expanded federal securities law preemption of state disclosure
rules.224 They supported further centralization of federal securities law
jurisdiction in response to the perceived circumvention of federal
limitations on private securities suits via state court suits.225 On the
international level, U.S. industries support international harmonization of
accounting standards, and not diversity.226 Coates suggests this push for
harmonization and failure to embrace issuer choice show that issuer
choice proposals lack merit.227
A more nuanced explanation may also be available. The behavior of
corporate America may not necessarily be inconsistent with the claims of
issuer choice proponents as to the beneficent effects of such a system.
Moreover, at least on the domestic level, issuers’ support for
federalization of securities law may not evidence a distaste for regulatory
competition among states—which was never among the choices
available—as much as distaste for the burden of complying with multiple
standards. Complying with one mandatory set of rules is easier and
cheaper than complying with fifty-one mandatory sets of rules. But this is
not to say that issuers would not prefer, if permitted, to choose just one set
of rules that would apply nationwide.
However, the timing of the realization of these claimed benefits may
matter, as they do for politicians.228 For risk averse firm managers with
short time horizons, the move to an issuer choice system may simply be
too disruptive in the short term. Switching costs may be substantial.229
Short-term earnings performance drives stock prices and affects
managers’ decision making. Managers may not relish unpredictable
short-term perturbations in stock prices caused by wholesale changes in
the securities regulatory structure. Managers understand the current rules.
They and their professional advisers understand how to operate under
them. Analysts and institutional investors understand how to price
securities under the current regulatory structures. By contrast, even if
issuer choice would lead ultimately to lower capital costs, markets and
market professionals would require some time to adjust to such a radical
223. Coates, supra note 137, at 538-39.
224. Id. at 538 (discussing National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996).
225. Id. (discussing Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998).
226. Id. at 539.
227. Id. at 542.
228. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
229. “[T]he lack of corporate demand for devolution[ is] not surprising in a pathdependent world where any change requires costly adjustments and the loss of sunk
capital investments by some participants.” William J. Carney, Jurisdictional Choice in
Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 717, 720-21 (2001).
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change. How markets would behave during this transition period would
be difficult to predict. The sheer uncertainty may deter managers and
investors from supporting such a change. In addition, managers in high
regulation jurisdictions like the United States may fear a negative
signaling effect from opting out of U.S. regulation. Finally, not only
would managers have to worry about the price effect of issuer choice on
their own securities in absolute terms, but they would also have to be
concerned about the relative impact of this change on their competitors’
capital raising activities.230 For all these reasons, risk averse managers
with short time horizons may simply not wish to undertake to manage the
transition from one equilibrium to another, even if the new equilibrium is
ultimately more advantageous once achieved.231
Regardless of whether the current position of corporate America
undercuts the supposed longer-term benefits of issuer choice, it certainly
calls into question the near-term political feasibility of issuer choice
proposals. On the other hand, U.S. issuers also oppose regulatory price
discrimination, which forces them to pay higher “prices” than their
foreign counterparts in terms of more stringent regulatory requirements.
Their push for harmonization is consistent with this stance. It may be that
for U.S. issuers, harmonization represents the most fruitful short-term
strategy to raise capital costs for their foreign rivals.
U.S. issuer opposition to regulatory price discrimination, however,
should not be overstated. Corporations have in the past organized
effectively to affect securities regulatory policy, through such collective
organizations as the Business Roundtable and the like.232 However, there
is some reason to believe that the differential regulatory burdens as
between domestic and foreign issuers would have to be substantial, and
the number of foreign issuers benefiting from disparate regulation would
have to increase, before domestic issuers in general would be willing to

230. Especially with respect to foreign rivals who are not already raising capital
in the United States, U.S. issuers currently enjoy a natural advantage because of their
mastery of the system. As issuer choice advocates and others have suggested, the
regulatory and other intricacies of capital raising in the United States may inhibit some
foreign entrants. A move to issuer choice, however, would very likely erode this natural
advantage that U.S. issuers currently enjoy.
231. In a related context, Romano has argued that risk averse firm managers may
prefer a maximin strategy with respect to law reform, preferring the status quo to
unpredictability in corporate law. See Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in
Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 722 (1987) (explaining why firm managers may
prefer Delaware’s constitutional provision requiring a two-thirds supermajority for
amendments to its corporation law).
232. See Coates, supra note 137, at 540-42 (discussing role of industry
representatives in overcoming collective action problems to enact major federal securities
law reform).
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commit resources to political action. The existence of differential
burdens of mandatory disclosure, for example, is not likely to be the first
thing on a CEO’s mind. U.S. firms have adapted to their disclosure
burdens, the costs of which are buried in their legal and accounting bills,
and which can to some extent be passed on to customers, suppliers,
employees, and investors.
Moreover, domestic firms will vary in the extent to which they feel
any effects from regulatory price discrimination. A given domestic firm
will associate differential regulatory burdens with a loss of
competitiveness with foreign rivals only if its foreign rivals undertake
substantial capital raising in U.S. public markets. Without numerous
specific incidents of this lowering of foreign rivals’ costs from regulatory
price discrimination, it is not likely to be an issue of general interest
across corporate America. Merritt Fox has noted, for example, that large
U.S. issuers have voiced almost no objection to a proposal backed by the
NYSE to relieve foreign issuers from having to reconcile their books to
U.S. GAAP.233 U.S. firms are far more likely to focus on product
competition with their foreign rivals, as opposed to financing competition.
Lobbying for tariff protection against foreign products, for example, is
common. Lobbying to bar or impede “imports” of foreign securities
seems less likely.
C. The Calculus of International Consent
In addition to the improbability of interest group alignments
supporting issuer choice in regulatory price-setting jurisdictions,
international issuer choice agreements will be difficult to achieve.
Despite its offhand treatment by issuer choice advocates, the choice of
law cooperation that would be necessary to implement private choice is
far from trivial or easily accomplished. Besides the prospect of domestic
interest group opposition in regulatory price-setting jurisdictions, the
mechanics of international policy coordination suggest further hurdles
that would have to be overcome in order for international issuer choice to
emerge.
1. INTERNATIONAL COALITIONS AND DISPERSED VETO POWER
The global legal environment is “tilted against effective
regulation.”234 In the domestic context, collective action can effect
233. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 765 & n.148.
234. Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental
Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 761 (1999).
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binding policy change on dissenters through the assembling of a majority
coalition. However, assembly of the requisite coalitions
in the
international context is much more difficult, especially in the absence of
some pre-existing transnational institutional structure.235
Among anarchic nations,236 the voting rule in international
policymaking is a sort of unanimity requirement. Each state sought to be
bound by treaty must assent to it. Objecting states are not bound.
Therefore, overcoming collective action problems among states may be
quite a formidable task. Each state must either perceive itself a net
winner by participating, or transfer payments must be arranged. This
means that within each participating state, a majority coalition must exist
that stands to benefit from participation.
In effect, the power to veto international agreements is more widely
available among interest groups than with domestic legislation. The
existence of an opposing majority coalition in any prospective
participating state will cause that state’s rejection of the arrangement.
Even strategic delay by an opposing minority in one nation might scuttle
an agreement if majority coalitions in important states cannot be held
together long enough for an agreement to be reached. Given this context,
the opposition of the regulatory bureaucracy in any important state could
be fatal to the achievement of a widely accepted issuer choice treaty.
Ideally, for an international issuer choice regime, the United States
and other regulatory price-setting jurisdictions would participate. The
existence of a blocking coalition within any of these jurisdictions would
damage the prospects for achieving an issuer choice agreement, and
would diminish the benefits of any agreement achieved.
2. COMPLEXITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUER CHOICE TREATY
Even aside from the private interests in particular states that would
oppose issuer choice, implementation of the requisite choice of law
cooperation may be impeded by technical concerns. The terms of an
issuer choice treaty would hardly be straightforward. Uncertainty as to
the particular operation of securities laws under an international issuer
choice arrangement will tend to hamper treaty efforts.

235. See Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 31, 90 (2001) (discussing role of international institutions in facilitating
cooperation).
236. “Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits
on the pursuit of sovereign interests.” Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under
Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38 WORLD POL. 1 (1985).
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Choice of law rules are notoriously indeterminate,237 and
international issuer choice agreements may be difficult to specify with
particularity ex ante. The point of any issuer choice arrangement is to
enable private parties to displace local regulation with regulation of their
own choosing. However, transplanting a regulatory regime from its
original context to another jurisdiction is unlikely to be a neat and tidy
affair. Especially in industrial countries, securities regulation is fairly
complex, depending not only on intricate rules but also on numerous
institutions for its implementation. Not only regulators, but courts, stock
exchanges, and self-regulating organizations all play a role. In the United
States, each of these institutions may play a role in ex ante supervision as
well as ex post enforcement. Importing a securities regulatory regime by
contract or treaty will not be a straightforward enterprise. A simple
choice of law rule requiring respect for private choice of substantive law
does not by itself replicate the institutional arrangements that may be
critical to a regulatory regime.238
Any treaty committing nations to private choice would likely rely on
imprecise standards and ex post discretion of judges or regulators.
Regulators and their important constituents might therefore have
difficulty anticipating the consequences of a private choice arrangement,
and firms might be unable to predict the effect of their private choices.
This indeterminacy could make interest groups reluctant to support such
agreements in the first place.
Enforcement raises perhaps the most significant concern.
Enforcement across jurisdictions, if workable at all, is likely to be
difficult to specify and difficult to police. Each nation is likely to rely on
particular legal institutions to enforce its laws, and some may be unique to
its securities regulation. An arrangement for private choice would require
some consideration for whether and which enforcement institutions
“travel” with the choice of substantive law.
The trade offs in terms of regime-selected institutions versus homecountry enforcement have been aired. Romano and Choi and Guzman
argue that regime-selected regulators and institutions are best situated to
enforce, since they will generally be experts on the nuances of the legal

237. See Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the
Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 416, 427-28 (1999)
(identifying indeterminacy of choice of law rules as reason for absence of choice of law
requirement for judgment recognition).
238. “[T]he institutions necessary for effective securities regulation are not easily
transplantable. The primary problem . . . is local enforcement and local culture in the
receiving country, for even world-class laws need to be understood by those subject to
them and enforced by state institutions.” Licht, supra note 129, at 679; see also Cox,
supra note 20, at 1240 (discussing crucial interpretive role of SEC staff).
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rules to be applied.239 Centralizing litigation and other enforcement
activity in this way enables consistent development of the regime-selected
law, as compared to other approaches that involve interpretation by
various nations’ courts. Finally, the benefits of regulatory competition are
maximized when the legislative and judicial functions come under the
same sovereign. When authority over outcomes is split between the rule
givers of one state and the judiciary of another, the rule-giving state is
impeded in its ability to respond to consumer demand. It cannot
guarantee that its regulatory product will be sufficiently nuanced to
display all the features consumers want.240
On the other hand, as Steven Walt notes, the conduct to be regulated,
and which would form the basis for any lawsuit, is most likely to occur in
the issuer’s home country. Local institutions in the home country are
likely to be more familiar with local business practices. Therefore, the
home country may be the most convenient venue for regulating conduct,
gathering evidence, and realizing on the firm’s assets.241 According to
Walt, being “on the ground” where violative conduct occurs gives homecountry regulators a natural advantage over their foreign counterparts. It
may be easier for home-country regulators to master the various
substantive laws they must enforce under issuer choice than it would be
for foreign regulators to operate in the local legal environment.242
Conceptually, it would seem that as a matter of consistency with the
premises of the brief for private choice, regime-selected institutions have
one other significant factor recommending them. Enforcement must be
seen as an integral aspect to the product itself, and if states are meant to
be competing suppliers in an international market for regulatory products,
then only the supplier has the right incentives to “service” the product
properly. Not only may the issuer’s home-country institutions lack
sufficient incentive or sufficient administrative capacity to enforce the
regime-selected rules faithfully, but they may have incentive to do just the
opposite. Home-country enforcers may have incentive to sabotage
competitors’ products by tinkering with enforcement. It is not difficult to
imagine situations in which home-country enforcers may be able to favor
local interests in particular cases, while at the same time creating

239. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 931 (recommending regime
jurisdiction as default rule); Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 407 (same).
240. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 407 & n.46.
241. See Steven Walt, Introduction: Privatization and Its Prospects, 41 VA. J.
INT’L L. 517, 527 (2001); see also Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 928.
242. See Walt, supra note 241. In addition, as Jim Cox has noted, it may be
difficult to structure appropriate incentives to encourage foreign regulators’ vigorous
enforcement of their own laws in jurisdictions where they have no political constituents.
See Cox, supra note 20, at 1240-41.
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confusion over application of another state’s rules. Such an enforcement
strategy would serve to discourage local firms from choosing non-local
rules, advantaging the local regulatory product in the local market.
This enforcement morass is only the most immediate question mark
for issuer choice arrangements. The complications of enforcement
suggest that treaties facilitating the private mixing and matching of
regulatory regimes are not likely to be simple. An unadorned edict to
honor firms’ private choice will not be sufficient. Negotiating agreement
on these issues among multiple states—each state with its own
commercial and corporate law, culture and history, as to which any issuer
choice regime would have to be integrated—is likely to be quite
difficult.243
The complexity of these issues portends not merely difficulty in
treaty drafting, but indeterminacy as to outcomes. Even if law makers
and their important interest groups supported private choice in theory,
they might have difficulty predicting how such an arrangement would
work, what national commitments would entail, and how private benefits
would be distributed. These indeterminacies might discourage the
establishment of such arrangements at the outset.
Issuer choice advocates have failed to grapple with these difficulties.
For example, while Choi and Guzman express doubt that states could
cooperate successfully on harmonizing substantive rules,244 they fail to
acknowledge that an international regime of issuer choice would also

243. “A choice of law treaty is not unprecedented, although the characteristics of
different investors and default rules might complicate the product.” Walt, supra note 241,
at 525.
244. They cite insider trading rules as an example:
[E]fforts on the part of countries to construct workable international
cooperation in securities regulation, although fine in theory, are most likely to
fail. In theory, countries may design efficient securities regulations through
international cooperation that would be enforced globally. Parties engaging in
securities fraud, for example, would find it difficult to escape enforcement
under a perfect global regulatory regime. In practice, of course, the existing
global regulatory regime is far from perfect. Although the SEC has met with
some success in gaining cooperation from other countries regarding insider
trading laws, international cooperation remains limited. Despite the facial
success of the SEC's efforts, agreements between countries are often difficult
and time consuming to obtain. Moreover, once agreements are signed,
countries must expend resources monitoring compliance. For example, initial
evidence on the insider trading laws instituted in Japan and Switzerland
demonstrate less than vigorous enforcement. Over time, national regulatory
bodies may take over the agreement, adding provisions and increasing the
complexity of the regime to enhance the importance of the regulatory
agencies.
Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 915-16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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require politically significant cooperation among states, perhaps even
more politically significant than substantive harmonization.
D. Alternative Ending: Harmonization?
The preceding discussion predicts a failure of supply in terms of
choice of law rules that would be necessary to effect issuer choice. The
same discussion further serves as a roadmap to more likely political
outcomes.
The regulatory price discrimination strategy that the SEC to some
extent has already pursued may generate stronger opposition from U.S.
issuers over time. The costs to domestic issuers of differential regulatory
burdens as compared to foreign issuers may at some point become
sufficiently large and widespread that collective action for U.S. issuers
will make sense. Bill Carney has predicted, for example, that pressure
from the exchanges will lead the SEC to accept international disclosure
standards for foreign issuers. “And once foreign issuers can avoid U.S.
GAAP and some other burdens of U.S. regulation, can parity for U.S.
issuers be far behind?”245
Parity for U.S. issuers—if it does come—may take the form of
harmonized international standards. It is not likely to lead to issuer
choice. A prediction of harmonization, moreover, more closely comports
with the public choice assumptions of issuer choice proponents.
Harmonization and the ongoing international negotiations required to
implement it preserve and augment regulators’ authority, prestige, and
budget.246 International negotiations are likely to be complicated and
technical affairs, placing the SEC and other national regulators at the
center of international reform that is to a great extent insulated from
political accountability.247 Jon Macey cites as one example the SEC’s
lobbying of other states to adopt and enforce U.S.-style insider trading
prohibitions.248 He argues that this harmonization effort was driven by
the SEC’s desire to maintain its own authority by preventing regulated
parties’ easy exit to more lax jurisdictions. The SEC has additionally
used its position within IOSCO to push for harmonization.249

245. Carney, supra note 229, at 723.
246. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 59 (characterizing SEC efforts at
international coordination of insider trading enforcement as an attempt to preserve its own
authority).
247. See Paul Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743 (1999) (describing work of
international private legislatures).
248. See Colombatto & Macey; see also supra note 59.
249. See id. at 953; supra Part I.A.2.
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In addition, harmonization may provide important benefits to
various U.S. constituencies the SEC has traditionally supported.
Harmonization efforts will generally result in international standards
lower than existing U.S. standards but higher than those of most other
states. Successful harmonization may therefore drive marginal foreign
issuers to the United States by raising their costs of issuing outside the
United States while lowering their costs of issuing in the United States.
The securities industry can therefore be expected to benefit from
harmonization.
Local lawyers and accountants would also benefit insofar as the
value of their expertise would be preserved. Domestic securities law may
change, but it will not be replaced wholesale by foreign law, as under
issuer choice. Harmonization may also benefit U.S. issuers insofar as it
raises foreign rivals’ capital costs—depending on the agreed substantive
standards—as compared to the status quo.
In effect, harmonization strikes a politically more acceptable
distribution of benefits among interested parties than does issuer choice.
The SEC’s role in securities regulation is not threatened. Its expertise and
that of private securities lawyers and accountants remain relevant.
Securities firms retain some of their informational and other advantages,
and they and exchanges enjoy increased volume. Issuers get a level
playing field with their foreign rivals. This is not to suggest that
harmonization will necessarily be easy to achieve across the broad range
of securities law issues. But the incentives are right.
IV. CONCLUSION
Issuer choice proponents have raised novel and interesting arguments
favoring regulatory competition in securities law. However, the debate so
far is incomplete. Scholars have debated the demand side. They have
theorized about the behavior of firms and investors in demanding optimal
securities law. However, issuer choice proponents have yet to provide a
full account of the supply side. In a competitive setting, it may be that
regulators would have incentive to supply optimal rules in order to
expand their regulatory purview and benefit favored constituents.
However, structuring a competitive setting in the first place will require a
special set of choice of law rules to be agreed among states. Regulators
will have insufficient incentive to push for such rules, largely for the
exact reasons issuer choice advocates cite for their predictions of vigorous
competition over substantive rules in the ideal global market for law. If
regulators value increasing prestige and scope of their regulatory
authority, if they wish to maximize the number of regulated firms within
their purview, then they will not readily agree to give up the territorial
monopolies they already enjoy.
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Legislative and executive action is possible—and would in all
likelihood be required—in order to establish the competitive setting issuer
choice advocates envision. However, regulators would be powerful
opponents of any international cooperative endeavors that would weaken
their regulatory monopolies. Other interest groups exist, but it is
doubtful—at least in the United States and probably in other price-setting
jurisdictions as well—that any would prefer issuer choice to the
regulatory price discrimination that is the status quo. Moreover, the
complexities associated with any international issuer choice treaty make
credible commitments difficult to obtain.
Political feasibility may seem a harsh metric against which to
appraise normative scholarship. After all, knowing the contours of the
first best solution is valuable though we may readily concede the
difficulty of its implementation. Issuer choice proposals, however,
deserve particular scrutiny in this regard because they depend critically on
assumptions about bureaucratic behavior in an international setting, but
much that is important about that international setting is assumed away.
The anarchy of the international setting, so central to the work of scholars
in international relations and other disciplines, cannot be so easily set
aside.250 No global framework for regulatory competition exists. With
that factored into the analysis, the assumptions ultimately show the
improbability of the issuer choice proposal,251 as well as the probability of
regulatory price discrimination.
Doubting issuer choice is not to say that securities laws will not
adapt because of competitive pressures. Others have made the case that
the SEC, for example, is already responsive to the concerns of U.S.
250. Ironically, Choi & Guzman doubt the promise of other approaches to
international coordination on political feasibility grounds. They are skeptical of “normal”
reciprocity arrangements—which require an issuer selling securities in a foreign market
merely to comply with its domestic regulatory regime. This skepticism arises in part
because “countries typically consider such agreements only when the laws of the
signatories are extremely similar.” Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 920. In addition,
regulators fear investor confusion if securities trading on local markets were subject to
various different regulatory regimes. “This concern typically reduces the interest of
regulators in reciprocity arrangements, which minimizes the number of such agreements
and their impact on regulatory competition.” Id. Presumably, though, these same factors
impede the prospects for issuer choice reciprocity at least as much.
251. In a related context, another scholar has observed:
one of the difficulties presented by public-choice-oriented normative
scholarship: what is a public choice . . . scholar to do, when the audience he is
trying to influence, whom he is trying to get to adopt his recommendations, is
composed of the same group of people that his own theories suggest are not
collectively capable of pursuing the public interest?
Kyle D. Logue, If Taxpayers Can’t Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can: A Public Choice
Perspective on the Tax Transition Debate, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1507, 1529 (2000).
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issuers and the securities industry.252 The competition-driven evolution of
national securities laws is already underway. Issuers and investors are
mobile now to some extent and will only grow more so over time.
However, the sort of mobility envisioned by issuer choice advocates
depends on international cooperation over explicit legal rules endorsing
exit from regulatory regimes in which too many are too deeply invested.
Those legal rules will be in short supply.

252.

See Coates, supra note 137, at 553.

